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YEAR IN REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
by the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
The primary purpose of this review is to familiarize the practitioner
with cases decided in 1992, the substantive areas of law addressed,
the statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence
of each of the holdings. Space does not permit review of all cases
decided by the courts this year. The authors have attempted,
however, to highlight decisions signaling a departure from prior law
or resolving issues of first impression. Attorneys are advised not to
rely upon the information contained in this note without further
reference to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter and import of holdings rather than by the nature of underly-
ing claims. The cases have been divided into the following twelve
areas of law: administrative, business, constitutional, criminal,
employment, family, fish and game, native, procedure, property, tax
and tort. In some instances, these categories have been further
subdivided into more specific legal areas. The appendix lists the
cases that were omitted from this year's review. Generally, such
cases applied well-settled principles or involved narrow holdings of
limited import.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court heard several administrative law
cases in 1992. The summaries have been divided into the following
categories: allocation of administrative power; public utilities;
regulation of land, construction and the environment; prison
administration; regulation of motor vehicles; and procedural issues.
A. Allocation of Administrative Power
In Sonneman v. Hickel,' the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed
a challenge that the statute creating the Alaska Marine Highway
System Fund (Highway Fund) violates the Alaska Constitution.2
The court held that Alaska Statutes section 19.65.080(b), limiting the
Copyright © 1993 by Alaska Law Review
1. 836 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1992).
2. Id at 937 (citing ALAsKA CONST. art. IX, § 7; ALASKA STAT. §§ 19.65.050-
100 (Supp. 1992)).
1993]
172 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1
departmental power to appropriate funds for "capital improve-
ments," did indeed violate Article IX, Section 7 of the Alaska
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he proceeds of any state tax or
license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose."3
Although the act does not specifically require the legislature to
earmark funds for the Highway Fund, the act effectively prevents
the legislature from spending that money elsewhere.4 The court
found that the act unconstitutionally restricts the authority of the
executive branch to seek appropriations.5 The court held that
Article IX, Section 7 implies not only that the legislature retains
authority to control appropriations from all sources, but that
governmental departments can also request money from all sources.
Thus, Alaska Statutes section 19.65.080(b), which expressly limits
the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities' right to
demand funds, violates the constitution.6 The supreme court
concluded that because Alaska statutory law contains a general
severability clause creating a weak presumption in favor of sever-
ance,7 the remaining portions of the statute shall continue to stand
independently and completely without the offending section.'
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Department
Employees Ass'n,9 the supreme court held that a municipality may
constitutionally delegate limited interest arbitration powers to a
labor arbitrator." The Municipality of Anchorage sued to have its
own ordinance declared unconstitutional before the Anchorage
Police Department Employees Association could submit its
collective bargaining agreement to binding interest arbitration."
In case of a failure to agree to a new contract before the expiration
of the old police contract, the ordinance required the appointment
of an arbitrator to render a binding decision on the parties. 2 The
arbitrator would draft the final contract by selecting article by article
3. d2 at 938 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7).
4. Id. at 939.
5. ML at 940.
6. ML (citing ALASKA STAT. § 19.65.080(b) (Supp. 1992)).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.030 (1990).
8. Sonnenan, 836 P.2d at 940-41.
9. 839 P.2d 1080 (Alaska 1992).
10. 1&t at 1090.
11. IM. at 1083.
12. Id. at 1082.
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from the parties' last best offers in accordance with applicable
law.13
The court held that the delegation of the Anchorage Assem-
bly's power to an arbitrator was not unconstitutional per se, but
noted that the court was "'less concerned with the labels placed on
arbitrators as public or private, as politically accountable or
independent, than... with the totality of the protection against
arbitrariness provided in the statutory scheme. ' '  The court held
that in light of the detailed provisions that guide the arbitrator
against making arbitrary decisions, the delegation of legislative
power was constitutional. 5
In O'Callaghan v. State,6 the supreme court affirmed summary
judgment against the plaintiff, Mike O'Callaghan, a candidate for
governor on the Political Party ticket, who had claimed that Alaska
Statutes section 15.25.110 prohibits the candidate of one party in a
general election from resigning his nomination and reentering the
ballot as candidate for a different political party. Jack Coghill,
former candidate for lieutenant governor on the Republican ticket,
reentered the race as a member of the Alaska Independence Party.
In this case of statutory interpretation, the court found that the
statute was designed to keep an individual from reentering a general
election on the same ticket.'7 Finding no legislative intent to
prevent the unlikely event of someone switching parties on the
ticket, 8 the court noted its policy favoring access to the ballot and
reasoned that "it would be incongruous ... to now stretch to find
13. Id.
14. Id at 1084, 1085 (citation omitted) (quoting Town of Arlington v. Board
of Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 1976)).
15. Id. at 1089. The court mentioned a number of standards limiting the power
granted to the arbitrator. The arbitrator is selected from a list, with peremptory
challenges available to both parties. The arbitrator can determine only relevant
facts, including a number of factors expressly listed in the municipal code. The
arbitrator cannot write his own provisions, but rather must assemble the final
contract article by article from the last best offers of the parties. Finally, the
arbitrator must issue decisions consonant with the applicable law and follow the
procedural safeguards in the Voluntary Rules of Labor Arbitration published by the
American Arbitration Association. Id. at 1086-88.
16. 826 P.2d 1132 (Alaska), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 176 (1992).
17. Id. at 1136.
18. Id. at 1135-37.
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a prohibition against Coghill's candidacy when the election code
does not clearly prohibit it."19
In Alaska Public Employees Ass'n v. State,2' the supreme court
affirmed an administrative decision that held job classifications and
salary range assignments to be permissive rather than mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining under Alaska's Public Employment
Relations Act."' The supreme court agreed with the agency and
the superior court that the merit principle remains the most
important consideration implicated in job classification and pay
plans.' The court rejected the unions' claim that the job classifica-
tion duty statutorily imposed on the state constitutes a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.'
Unlike assigning actual dollar figures to a salary range for a
specific class, which is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
the court held that the assignment of salary ranges to individual job
classes clearly should be a permissive subject of bargaining.24 In
making this determination, the court pointed to the "state's strong,
specific, express mandate to act and the employees' more diffuse,
general, limited entitlement to bargain," and the fact that collective
bargaining representatives could still demand to bargain over the
wage rates assigned to the salary ranges.5
Justice Compton, joined by Chief Justice Rabinowitz, dissented
in part, asserting that because the power of job classification and
reclassification allows the state to control the wages of employees,
it should be the subject of mandatory bargaining.26 Justice Comp-
ton found persuasive the unions' claim that collective bargaining
over the assignment of job classifications to salary ranges does not
undermine the merit system'
19. Id. at 1137.
20. 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992).
21. Id. at 1252.
22. Id. at 1248-49 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 6).
23. Id. at 1249 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.250(8) (Supp. 1992), 23.40.070(2)
(1990), 39.25.150(1) (Supp. 1992)).
24. Id. at 1252.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1253-57 (Compton, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1256 (Compton, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10:1
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B. Public Utilities
In Far North Sanitation, Inc. v. Alaska Public Utilities Commis-
sion,' the supreme court reviewed an order issued by the Alaska
Public Utilities Commission (APUC) revoking Far North's exemp-
tion from rate regulation and rendering the company's rates
"interim" subject to refund pending a final rate determination.29
Far North challenged this decision as illegal retroactive rate-
making.3
0
Noting the liberal construction provision found in Alaska
Statutes section 42.05.141(a)(1), the supreme court stressed the
statute's wording: "'a legally filed and effective tariff rate... may
not be changed except in the manner provided for in this chap-
ter."' 31 The statute permits APUC to establish rates only after
conducting an investigation and a hearing.32 Although APUC
merely reinstated the previous rate as the interim rate, it erred in
failing to hold a hearing. The court held, however, that because Far
North waived its rights by appealing the APUC decision directly
before the agency, APUC's error was procedural rather than
jurisdictional. A timely appeal allows the agency to correct its
mistake by holding a hearing on the issue. Addressing the
agency's underlying scope of power, the court concluded that
although authorities conflict on this issue, "the better view is that
the APUC has implied authority to set interim rates."'
In Cook Inlet Pipe Line Co. v. Alaska Public Utilities Commis-
sion,35 the supreme court considered whether APUC's methods for
estimating rates for intrastate crude oil transportation tariffs violated
federal statutory law and the federal and state constitutions. APUC
calculated tariffs by the "original cost" method, whereas the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates interstate
tariffs, used a different method. The state's rates proved to be
substantially lower than the federal rates for the same time
period.37
28. 825 P.2d 867 (Alaska 1992).
29. Id. at 868.
30. Id. at 869.
31. Id. at 872 (omission in original) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.371 (1989)).
32. Id (citing ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.431(a) (Supp. 1992)).
33. Id. at 873.
34. Id.
35. 836 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1992).
36. Id at 344.
37. Id.
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The court reasoned that "'[it is not the theory, but the impact
of the rate order which counts.""'3 CIPL introduced little evidence
that the net economic effect of the rate scheme was detrimental to
the company and no evidence that any effect reached the constitu-
tional level of a threat to the financial integrity of the company.39
The court found without merit the claim that APUC's reduction of
the rate base constituted an unconstitutional taking. In the supreme
court's view, a "rate base" is a theoretical construct and not
"property.'' 4°
CIPL also claimed that APUC's tariff orders are preempted by
federal law. The supreme court noted that when the Alaska
legislature delegated power to APUC, the Interstate Commerce Act
governed the federal regulation of rates.41  The United States
Supreme Court has held, however, that the Interstate Commerce
Act was not intended to intrude on the states' authority to regulate
intrastate traffic.42 Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the Interstate Commerce Act did not authorize CIPL to
disregard APUC and set its own intrastate rates at the interstate
level.43 The court noted that a provision in the Transportation Act
of February 28, 1920 gives the FERC power, after a full administra-
tive hearing, to adjust intrastate rates that result in an unjust
discrimination against, or an undue burden on, interstate rates.44
CIPL, however, expressly opted not to seek that remedy.45
In Colville Environmental Services, Inc. v. North Slope Bor-
ough,' North Slope Borough challenged APUC's authority to
certify two waste disposal servicers in an overlapping area and to
prevent the Borough from passing ordinances to interfere with the
business of its new waste disposal competitor.47 The Borough
38. Id at 349 (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314
(1989); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,602 (1944)).
39. Id at 350.
40. Id
41. Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1959)).
42. Id (citing Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 418 (1913)).
43. Id at 350-51.
44. Id at 351 (quoting the Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 13(4) (1959)).
45. Id at 351 & n.8.
46. 831 P.2d 341 (Alaska 1992).
47. The Borough's challenge was deemed "belated" by the supreme court, since
the Borough had been a party to the original hearing five years ago, but had not
appealed the agency's decision to issue a certificate to Colville. Id. at 342.
[Vol. 10:1
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argued that APUC had no jurisdiction to issue a certificate for
garbage collection to Colville, claiming that pursuant to Alaska
Statutes section 29.35.050, the Borough held exclusive power to
monopolize collection services." The superior court agreed with
the Borough, refusing to give res judicata effect to APUC's orders
granting competitive certificates.49
In examining the res judicata effect of APUC's decisions, the
supreme court employed the three-prong test found in section
twelve of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as its guide5 °
First, the court held that APUC possesses liberally construed powers
over its specific jurisdictional areas, its certification authority among
them, and thus the granting of Colville's certificate did not consti-
tute a manifest abuse of authority.5' Addressing the second prong
of section twelve, the court found it inapplicable because the
Borough appeared as both an agency of government and the party
that failed to file a timely appeal. The court reasoned that the
Borough lost only that which "a private litigant normally loses when
an adverse judgment is not appealed."52 With regard to the third
prong, the court found that APUC was capable of making an
informed determination of its own jurisdiction.53 The Commission
staff possessed the requisite level of professional qualifications?'
48. Id. at 345 (citing ALASKA STAT. 29.35.050 (1992)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 345-46. The supreme court explained:
[A] judgment does not have preclusive effect when:
"(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond
the [adjudicative agency's] jurisdiction that its entertaining the
action was a manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially
infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of
government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by [an adjudicative agency]
lacking capability to make an adequately informed determina-
tion of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a
matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the,
judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the
[adjudicative agency's] subject matter jurisdiction."
Id (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12
(1982)).
51. Id. at 346-48.
52. Id. at 348.
53. Id. at 350.
54. Id.
1993]
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Thus, Colville's certificate was valid and the superior court erred in
refusing to accord res judicata effect to the Commissions's orders.55
C. Land, Construction and the Environment
In Longwith v. State Department of Natural Resources,56 the
supreme court agreed with the Trustees for Alaska and held that the
Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources abused her
discretion in awarding agricultural preference rights to Longwith to
rectify losses he sustained in the invalidated Potlach Ponds land
lottery." The Potlach Ponds land lottery had been enjoined and
then later struck down, but to speed the administration of the
lottery if upheld, "winners" were drawn, Longwith among them.8
The "winners" could not participate in any further lotteries before
agreeing to drop any potential claims to the Potlach Ponds land.59
After the lottery was permanently enjoined, the Commissioner
found that Longwith had suffered an "inequity," and she henceforth
invoked her statutory power under Alaska Statutes section
38.05.035(b)(2).
The court held that the Commissioner erred in granting
Longwith preference rights. First, the court concluded that
"Longwith did not sustain an 'inequitable detriment' since the
superior court, at the outset, ruled that the lottery 'winners' [were]
determined only for purposes of administrative efficiency [and] did
not acquire any rights or interests in any Potlatch Ponds parcels as
a result of the invalidated lottery."'  The court also noted that the
decision to forego participation in future lotteries was within
Longwith's control, since he chose to wait and see if his appeal
would be successful in the face of the superior court ruling against
hin.61
In Trustees for Alaska v. Gorsuch,62 the Trustees challenged
decisions of the Commissioner of Natural Resources and the
Department of Natural Resources that issued a surface coal mining
and reclamation permit pursuant to the Alaska Surface Coal Mining
55. Id at 351.
56. No. S-4476, 3903, 1992 WL 364207 (Alaska Dec. 11, 1992).
57. Id, slip op. at 8-10, 13.
58. Id., slip op. at 2-4 (citing State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1984)).
59. Id., slip op. at 4.
60. Id., slip op. at 13.
61. Id.
62. 835 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1992).
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Control and Reclamation Act (Alaska Mining Act).63 The Trust-
ees claimed that the Department of Natural Resources exceeded its
discretion by failing to require that various off-site facilities (port
facilities, solid waste disposal facilities, gravel pits and a housing
facility with an air strip and access road) be covered under the
permit issued to Diamond Shamrock-Chuitna Coal Joint Venture.
The supreme court first held that the legislature intended the
Act to be construed in compliance with its federal counterpart, the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Federal
Mining Act).' 4  The court further held that the Department's
"decision to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the disputed
facilities lacked a reasonable basis," as the statutory definition of
"surface coal mining operations" encompassed the facilities.'
Under the agency's own regulations, a permit was required for many
of the facilities at issue.6
The court, however, rejected the Trustees' second claim that the
entire surface coal mining operation must be covered under a single
Alaska Mining Act permit rather than under separate permits.67
The court nevertheless concluded that "statutory language does
support Trustees' related argument that [the agency] may not ignore
cumulative effects of mining and related support facilities by
unreasonably restricting its jurisdiction and disregarding the effect
of activities outside that jurisdiction."'  The supreme court
remanded the case to the Department of Natural Resources to
consider the cumulative environmental effects of the entire
operation, including the off-site facilities.
69
63. Id. at 1241 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 27.21.010-.999 (1983)).
64. I& at 1242 (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1986)).
65. Id. at 1244 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 27.21.998(17) (1983)).
66. Id. at 1245 (citing ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 90.155, 90.491 (Oct.
1988)).
67. Id. at 1246.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1246-47. Chief Justice Rabinowitz, joined by Justice Matthews,
dissented with respect to allowing separate permits to cover the single project, given
the language of the Federal Mining Act, the Alaska Mining Act, and regulations
written by the Department of Natural Resources. Id. at 1250 (citing Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 506(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1988); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 27.21.060,27.21.998(17) (1983); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 90.002(c)
(Oct. 1988)) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). Rather than endorsing the "concept
approval" approach put forth by the majority, Chief Justice Rabinowitz believed
that the requirement to plan and design an operation for a single permit will affect
analysis of "the operation's cumulative effect in a more careful and comprehensive
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
In Homer Electric Ass'n v. Towsley, 0 the supreme court
construed Alaska Statutes section 18.60.670 to prohibit the place-
ment of equipment within ten feet of power lines, rather than the
mere placement of equipment whose parts could potentially move
to within that distance. The plaintiff, the estate of decedent
Towsley, sued for wrongful death on the theory that the erection of
a crane that could potentially extend into the ten-foot zone
constituted negligence per se.'
The court rejected each of the plaintiff's three arguments: that
the legislature did not intend to have the statute interpreted literally
in light of a prior similar provision in the Alaska General Safety
Code;73 that a literal interpretation frustrates the purpose of the
statute to promote public safety;74 and that such a decision renders
subsection two of the statute redundant.7' In particular, while
alleged superfluity of a statute can be persuasive, the court
concluded that the argument was not strong enough to overcome
the presumption of a literal interpretation. 76 The court also
countered the superfluity argument with reference to another
statutory provision governing the requisite accompanying warning
signs which must be posted. Such signs are required to caution
against operating equipment "within ten feet," and not against
operating when equipment might come within that distance.'
Justice Compton dissented, arguing that the majority erred in
assuming the statute to have a single literal meaning, in ignoring the
manner." Id at 1251 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
70. 841 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1992).
71. Id. at 1047. Alaska Statutes section 18.60.670 provides that "[a] per-
son ... may not (1) place ... machinery... that is capable of lateral, vertical, or
swinging motion, within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or
conductor, (2) store, operate [or] erect... machinery... within 10 feet of a high
voltage overhead electrical line or conductor." ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.670 (1991).
72. Homer Electric, 841 P.2d at 1043.
73. Id. at 1044 (citing 1969 Alaska General Safety Code, § 312-20 (prohibiting
the erection of equipment "when it is possible" for any part to come within ten feet
of high voltage lines) (repealed 1973)).
74. ME The court recognized that while the plaintiff's interpretation increased
safety, the court's literal view of the statute promoted greater safety than no such
prohibition at all and allowed for efficiency. Id.
75. Id. at 105. See supra note 71.
76. Md.
77. IdM at 1046 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 18.60.675 (1991)).
[Vol. 10:1
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resulting superfluity, and in not construing the statute to promote
safety to the fullest.78
D. Prison Administration
In Hays v. State,7 9 the supreme court reviewed a prisoner's
claim of a due process violation ensuing from termination from his
job in the prison library.' Hays relied on Ferguson v. Department
of Corrections," where the supreme court had previously held that
prisoners have an "'enforceable interest in continued participation
in rehabilitation programs"' under Alaska law.' The court
distinguished Ferguson, holding that the state did not deny Hays all
rehabilitative opportunities, but rather merely transferred him from
one prison employment position to another.' Given the lack of an
enforceable constitutional interest, the superior court did not err in
dismissing Hays's administrative appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.'
In C. G.A. v. State," the supreme court held that federal law
will preempt the state's attempt to make a mother use her minor
son's social security survivor's benefits to support him while
incarcerated.s6 C.G.A.'s mother had voluntarily relinquished her
position as her son's payee, and a subsequent superior court order
allowed the State of Alaska to apply to replace her.' The United
States Supreme Court had previously held that federal social
security law prevents attachment or garnishment by the state of
those benefits which have already been paid." However, in
addressing C.G.A.'s claim to preserve his benefits, the supreme
court concluded "that statutory authority exists for the state to be
designated C.G.A.'s representative payee, and that, as payee, the
78. ML at 1047 (Compton, J., dissenting).
79. 830 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1992).
80. I. at 784.
81. 816 P.2d 134, 139 (Alaska 1991).
82. Hays, 830 P.2d at 785 (quoting Ferguson v. Department of Corrections, 816
P.2d 134, 139 (Alaska 1991)).
83. I&
84. Id. (citing Hertz v. Carothers, 784 P.2d 659, 660 (Alaska 1990)).
85. 824 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1992).
86. Id. at 1365, 1367.
87. Id. at 1365-66.
88. Id. at 1367 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1983); Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S.
395 (1988)).
1993]
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state can devote C.G.A.'s benefit funds to authorized expendi-
tures." 9 The state may receive the money under Alaska Statutes
section 47.10.230(b), but may only use the money as permitted by
federal law.' The court referred the case to the Social Security
Agency to decide whether the appropriation could be used to pay
for incarceration.9
E. Motor Vehicles
In Pruitt v. State Department of Public Safety,' the supreme
court considered a breathalyzer test refusal (BTR), for which the
defendant was subject to criminal prosecution and possible revoca-
tion of his driver's license. The Division of Motor Vehicles revoked
Pruitt's license, but a magistrate subsequently dismissed the BTR
criminal charge. 3  The supreme court rejected Pruitt's claim of
collateral estoppel, since no final order had been issued by the
magistrate until after the administrative decision.94
The court also declined to fashion an administrative standard
different from that applicable to the criminal BTR, which allows the
driver to cure refusal under certain circumstances.' Adopting the
factors articulated in Lund v. Helle,' the court held that subse-
quent consent could cure an initial refusal upon showing the
following:
that the subsequent consent occurred within a reasonable time
after the prior first refusal; that the test administered following
the subsequent consent will still be accurate; that the test will
not result in any substantial expense or inconvenience to the
police; and that the arrestee has been in continuous custody of
the arresting officer and under observation for the entire time.'
The court then held that Pruitt's repeated refusal to submit to the
test, his consent only after administering a breath spray containing
alcohol, and his delaying tactics wasting the valuable time of law
enforcement meant that Pruitt failed, even under the flexible rule,
89. Id. at 1368.
90. Id. at 1368-69.
91. Id. at 1369-70.
92. 825 P.2d 887 (Alaska 1992).
93. Id. at 889.
94. Id. at 890.
95. Id at 893-94 (citing Lively v. State, 804 P.2d 66 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)).
96. 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D. 1974).
97. Pruitt, 825 P.2d at 894 (citing Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D.
1974)).
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to cure his refusal.9 The court therefore affirmed the revocation
of Pruitt's driver's license.99
F Administrative Procedure
In In the Matter of J.L.E and KWE, °° the supreme court
held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
Department of Health and Social Service's petition to adjudicate
J.L.E and K.W. as children in need of aid (CINA) and to
terminate their mother's parental rights. The jurisdictional statute
requires not only a finding of the parent's inability to care for the
child, but "that finding must also extend to any relatives who are in
fact caring for or willing to assume care."' 0'1 The court remanded
the case to the superior court, however, to determine whether the
same result would be reached under Alaska Statutes section
47.10.010(a)(2)(C), which authorizes a CINA adjudication if "'there
is an imminent and substantial risk that the child will suffer
harm. '"" '  The court also remanded for a finding as to whether
the mother, who is developmentally disabled, received parenting
instruction sufficiently geared to her special needs to allow her and
her children to reunite.0 3
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. State," the supreme
court affirmed the superior court's finding that Fairbanks North Star
Borough's suit for trespass, inverse condemnation, quiet title,
ejectment and rescission and restitution over the Department of
Natural Resources's invocation of a Cooperative Easement
Agreement was barred as an untimely appeal of an administrative
determination.0 5 The supreme court rejected this attempt to
establish jurisdiction, reasoning that the assertion relied on broad
constitutional provisions and that the Borough had been a party to
98. IM. at 894-95.
99. Id. at 895.
100. 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992).
101. Id. at 170 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) (1990)). The court
noted that "abandonment is evidence that no relative is willing or able to provide
care." Id at 170 n.9.
102. Id. at 170 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(C) (1990)).
103. Id. at 171-72.
104. 826 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1992).
105. I& at 761.
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an administrative hearing from which it could have directly
appealed."c The Borough attempted to differentiate the legal
taking alleged in the administrative action from the physical
intrusion in its condemnation claim and in the quiet title and
ejectment claims. The court nevertheless viewed the condemnation
claim as a direct challenge to the prior administrative decision. The
court further reasoned that the quiet title and ejectment claims were
attempts to do indirectly what the Borough could not do directly,
that is, challenge an administrative decision that was no longer
subject to appeal. °7
III. BusINEsS LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court decided several cases in
business law involving the interpretation of contracts. The court
addressed the issues of duty of care, the nature of professional
services, the recoverability of bid costs, and the liability of personal
guarantors. Additionally, the court considered a challenge by a
limited partner to the validity of the partnership, whether a state
treasury warrant is a negotiable instrument, and whether a plaintiff
can be estopped from asserting lender liability claims.
In Bank of California v. First American Title Insurance Co.,"~
the plaintiff agreed to provide a loan to a real estate development
company for construction of a strip mall. The loan was secured by
a deed of trust on the property.1l 9 At the request of the bank,
Security Title & Trust Agent of Alaska issued a preliminary
commitment for title insurance, which incorrectly stated that the
developer owned a fee simple estate in the property1 ° When the
loan was issued, First American Title Insurance Company issued a
policy of title insurance on the property,' insuring the Bank of
106. Id. at 763-64 (citing Owsichek v. State, 627 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1981)).
107. Id. at 764.
108. 826 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1992).
109. Id. at 1127.
110. Id. In fact, the president of the development company had quitclaimed part
of his interest -to his daughter. The deed was properly recorded. The president
then deeded his remaining interest to the company, but the daughter did not. Id.
111. Id.
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California against damage or loss should the title not be vested in
fee simple.12
The development company defaulted on the loan and the bank
discovered the company did not possess a fee simple in the property.
The bank brought an action for breach of contract and misrepresen-
tation against the two insurance companies. The bank claimed
Security Title was liable for negligently misrepresenting the
exclusive ownership of the property in its preliminary commitment,
and First American was vicariously liable for the misrepresentation
because Security Title had acted as First American's agent."
In this first impression case, the supreme court held that a title
company could be exposed to tort liability for misrepresentations
made in a preliminary commitment of title insurance."4 First, the
court reasoned that providing preliminary title information is "an
essential service to prospective buyers and lenders [who are] told
what transactions must take place before they can receive clear title
or an effective security.""' 5 Consequently, title insurance compa-
nies have a duty of care toward the customer." 6 However, the
duty remains one of reasonable care and not that of guarantor." 7
Second, Howarth v. Pfeifer"8 established liability "for negligent
misrepresentation 'where there is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give
correct information.""' 9  Considering the Howarth factors,' the
court concluded that a title insurance company has a duty "to
112. ML
113. Id. at 1128.
114. Id. at 1129.
115. Id.
116. IM
117. Id. at 1129 n.5.
118. 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).
119. Bank of California, 826 P.2d at 1129 (quoting Howarth, 443 P.2d at 42).
120. The factors were summarized in a later case and include: "(a) whether the
defendant had knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information was desired for
a serious purpose and that the plaintiff intended to rely upon it; (b) the foreseeabil-
ity of harm; (c) the degree of certainty that plaintiff would suffer harm; (d) the
directness of causation; and (e) the policy of preventing future harm." Id. (quoting
Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 760-61 (Alaska 1982)) (citing Howarth, 443 P.2d
at 42).
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accurately communicate the state of a title when issuing a prelimi-
nary commitment for title insurance. 'a2'
The court also dismissed Security Title's defense that a
disclaimer excused liability, reasoning that the disclaimer did not
clearly or explicitly state that Security Title would not be liable even
if found negligent."2  Moreover, the court discounted another
clause in the contract which could have effectively stayed any action
by the plaintiff until the defendant was given an opportunity to cure
the problem. The court found the clause immaterial because the
Bank's claim arose from the preliminary commitment rather than
from the title insurance policy."2
Lakeside Mall, Ltd. v. Hill 24 addressed whether a limited
partner (Neal) could raise various statutory filing defects to claim
that the company was not properly formed as a limited partnership,
consequently exposing the remaining limited partners to general
partner liability."z In a foreclosure action, the bank filed against
Neal as an original guarantor of the loan. 26 He, in turn, filed
cross- and third-party claims against his partners, contending that
the company had not been properly formed."
The court cited Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group"z for the
proposition that improper filing might affect the rights between
limited partners and creditors, but generally not the rights between
partners themselves.29 The court found that Neal was a partner
when a previous assumption agreement was signed, that he was a
partner during the time he claimed the defects existed, and that the
company did file the proper documents shortly after Neal left the
partnership.'3 For these reasons, the court concluded that Neal
was estopped as a matter of law from asserting his statutory defects
claim.
121. Id.
122. IM at 1130.
123. Id, at 1131.
124. 826 P.2d 1137 (Alaska 1992).
125. Id. at 1138.
126. Id at 1139.
127. Id.
128. 657 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1982).
129. Lakeside, 826 P.2d at 1141.
130. Id. at 1142.
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Dick Fischer Development No. 2, Inc., v. State Department of
Administration..' involved a contractor who sued the state to
recover bid preparation costs and other damages when the state
cancelled a large construction project for which Fischer had
submitted a competitive bid.132 The supreme court recognized that
by seeking bids the state "impliedly contracts to give those bids fair
and honest consideration" and moreover, that if the state's rejection
is capricious or arbitrary, the bidder is entitled to bid preparation
costs. 3 3 The court held, however, that the capricious or arbitrary
benchmark was overcome by the reasons for rejection advanced by
the state: (1) a lack of legislative support; (2) financing concerns;
and (3) alleged impropriety in the bidding process."
In National Bank of Alaska v. Univentures 1231,131 the su-
preme court held that a state treasury warrant is a negotiable
instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as enacted
in Alaska. 6 The superior court held that the warrant was not a
negotiable instrument governed by the UCC, and thus the National
Bank of Alaska had taken the warrant subject to the state's defense
that a stop payment order had been issued before the bank cashed
it.' 37 The supreme court reversed. The court found the warrant
satisfied the statutory requirements for negotiability 38 First, the
warrant was signed by the governor. 39  Second, the warrant
contained an unconditional promise to pay a specified sum.'
Third, the warrant was payable within a specified time: no more
than two years from the date of issue.'4 Finally, the warrant was
made payable to the order of Univentures." Thus, because the
131. 838 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1992).
132. Id. at 265.
133. Id. at 266 (citing King v. Alaska State Housing Auth., 633 P.2d 256 (Alaska
1981)).
134. Id. at 266-67.
135. 824 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1992).
136. Id at 1379.
137. Id. at 1378-79.
138. Id. at 1379. The requirements for negotiability are set out in Alaska
Statutes section 45.03.104(a) (1986).
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Id
142. Id.
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warrant satisfied the requisites of a negotiable instrument, NBA
took the warrant free from the defenses presented by the state.
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Republic Insurance
Co.,'4" the supreme court addressed whether an architect's bid for
a contract is included within the meaning of "professional services"
covered by a professional liability insurance policy.144 When a
competitor filed a complaint against ECI/Hyer for negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation,
injurious falsehood, and business disparagement in connection with
a successful contract bid, ECI/Hyer was insured by the defendant
against claims for negligence arising out of the "'rendering or failing
to render professional services.""' 45  The defendant refused,
however, to defend the architectural firm in the lawsuit. Rather, the
plaintiff successfully defended ECI/Hyer and subsequently sought
the defendant's pro rata share of the defense costs. 4"
The supreme court concluded that an architect's bid does
constitute a professional service. 47 Because the proposal included
a lengthy, detailed, specialized report, the court found that only an
architect employing his skills, knowledge and labor could have
prepared the bid."4 The court rejected the defendant's attempts
to distinguish between the "preparation" and the "rendering" of
professional services, reasoning that the insurance company could
have explicitly excluded bid preparation and submission from the
policy.149 Moreover, the court concluded settled law provides for
interpreting ambiguous terms in insurance policies in favor of
coverage.5
In Beck v. Haines Terminal & Highway Co.,' a dispute arose
as to the extent of a general manager's liability for the debts of his
employer under a personal guaranty agreement. Beck's employer
sought to secure credit with the defendant and Beck had his
143. 830 P.2d 785 (Alaska 1992).
144. I& at 786.
145. I. at 786-87 (quoting the insurance policy).
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id. at 788.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 843 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992).
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bookkeeper complete the two-page application. 5 2  Without
reading the document, Beck penned his signature, followed by the
designation "General Manager" on both pages. 53 The first page
was the application for a line of credit, but the second was a "Joint
Personal Guaranty," making the signor liable should the corporation
default."u When the company did default, the creditor secured
judgment against Beck as guarantor for $139,162.26.'Ys Beck
argued the personal guaranty should not be enforced on two
grounds: first, the creditor neither requested nor relied on the
guaranty in extending credit to his employer; and second, the signing
of the agreement with the designation "General Manager" evi-
denced his intent to enter the agreement in his corporate capacity,
not as an individual. 6 The supreme court found Beck's reliance
argument unsupported by the case law. 7 According to the court,
compelling a creditor to prove reliance serves no valid purpose and
would be unduly burdensome.'-"
The court had not previously rendered a decision as to
"whether a signature followed by a corporate designation on a
personal guaranty creates an ambiguity, necessitating consideration
of extrinsic evidence."' 59 While noting a split of authority in other
jurisdictions, the court adopted the approach used in the Tenth
Circuit, holding that when an agreement clearly professes to hold
the individual liable, a corporate designation such as "General
Manager" will not excuse the individual from personal liability."6
In Wright v. State,' the court held that a lender's liability
claims were barred by the doctrine of quasi estoppel when the
plaintiff failed to disclose those claims during bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 62 In August 1987, the state sued Wright to collect for
defaulted loans relating to his participation in the Point MacKenzie
152. Id. at 1230.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1230-31.
157. Id. at 1231.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 824 P.2d 718 (Alaska 1992).
162. Id. at 722.
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Agricultural Project, but those proceedings were stayed when
Wright filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition." Wright was
unable, however, to work out a satisfactory reorganization plan with
the state and his other creditors."a The bankruptcy court subse-
quently discharged Wright's debts following Chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings.'
During the pendency of his bankruptcy proceedings, Wright had
filed a lender liability suit, alleging numerous misrepresentations and
breaches by the state. Wright's request for relief included cancella-
tion of his indebtedness to the state and monetary damages."
Affirming the superior court dismissal of the plaintiff's lender
liability claims, the supreme court noted the "unconscionable
inconsistency" in allowing Wright to discharge his debts to the state
and other creditors during bankruptcy while retaining a right to later
pursue damages against the state.1 67 After the state filed its claims
against Wright, he petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceed-
ings. If not for the bankruptcy petition, Wright would have been
required to file his lender liability claims against the state as
compulsory counterclaims under Alaska Civil Rule 13(a).1 The
court reasoned that allowing Wright to recover damages after his
debts had been discharged would be inequitable as such damages
could have accrued to the benefit of the creditors instead of
Wright.1 69
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of
Appeals decided cases in several areas of constitutional law. The
decisions are divided into four categories: equal protection, due
process, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to counsel.
Overlap may exist between some of these categories and the section
163. Id at 719-20.
164. Id. at 720.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 722.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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summarizing cases on constitutional protections in the criminal
law. 70
A. Equal Protection
In Allam v. State,' the court of appeals denied an equal
protection challenge to former Alaska Statutes section
11.71.060(a)(3). The statute provides that a person older than
eighteen could possess up to four ounces of marijuana without
committing a crime, while persons under seventeen would fall under
the juvenile system.'72 The defendant argued the statute effective-
ly placed eighteen year-olds in a class by themselves, since only
eighteen year-olds could be criminally prosecuted for possessing
small amounts of marijuana. The court noted the Alaska legislature
specifically allowed for statutory exceptions to exist in the law when
it changed the age of majority to eighteen years: "There is no legal
requirement that the same age of majority apply to all activities and
circumstances."' 73 Since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
classification were involved, the court turned to the question of
whether the legislation was rationally related to furthering a
legitimate state interest.
The court of appeals found that although the defendant was
treated as a minor for purposes of marijuana regulation, this was not
inconsistent with his being prosecuted as an adult rather than a
juvenile. 74 The "policies underlying [Alaska's] juvenile justice
statutes are sufficiently distinct from the policies underlying the laws
regulating alcohol and drug use that the Alaska constitution does
not require the legislature to use the same age limit for both
purposes."'75 Thus, eighteen year-olds can be prosecuted as adults
who have not yet reached the legal age for marijuana possession.
170. See infra part V (A).
171. 830 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
172. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(1) (1990).
173. Allam, 830 P.2d at 437-38; see ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.010 (1990).
174. Allam, 830 P.2d at 440.
175. Id. at 440-41.
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B. Due Process
In Carvalho v. Carvalho,76 the court considered whether a
father's exclusion from a telephonic hearing conducted to determine
his past due child support obligation violated his due process rights.
Although the defendant did not physically attend the hearing or file
a Civil Rule 99 motion to attend telephonically, the court of appeals
nevertheless held that the trial court abused its discretion in not
allowing him to testify.' The outcome of the case rested on
contested facts that the defendant may have been able to coun-
ter.78 Because the hearing represented the defendant's sole
opportunity to present evidence, the defendant had a due process
right to be heard. 79
In Burnor v. State,'"° several defendants appealed class C
felony convictions for selling alcohol in Kotzebue. The community
had voted to ban the sale of alcohol beverages in a local option
election.' Alaska Statutes section 04.16.200 classifies the sale of
alcohol without a license or permit as a class A misdemeanor unless
a local option election prohibits the introduction of new or existing
alcohol licenses into the community," in which case it is a class
C felony.'" Burnor challenged the difference between penalty
provisions, claiming that it violated equal protection and due process
guarantees. The court of appeals stated that the legislature could
rationally decide to punish the unauthorized sale of alcohol in
communities that had affirmatively chosen to ban all alcohol sale
more severely than in communities where some alcohol sales were
permitted.' 4
176. 838 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1992).
177. Id. at 262.
178. Id. at 263.
179. Id.
180. 829 P.2d 837 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
181. IaM at 839.
182. ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.200(a) (1988).
183. ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.200(b) (1988).
184. Burnor, 829 P.2d at 839-40. The court also rejected Burnor's claims that
(1) criminalizing the sale of alcohol as a class C felony constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, and (2) Alaska Statutes section 04.16.200(b) violates due process by
failing to give adequate notice of its proscribed conduct and corresponding
penalties. Id. at 841-42.
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In Shetters v. State,"s the court of appeals confronted another
challenge to the constitutionality of local option elections."s
Shetters first contested Alaska Statutes section 04.11.496, under
which a Kiana local election had prohibited the sale and importation
of alcohol in its community."s He argued that the statute must be
read to prohibit the importation of alcohol meant for sale but not
that for personal possession." The court rejected this argument,
referring to the plain language of the statute which forbids an
individual to "'knowingly send, transport, or bring an alcoholic
beverage into the municipality or established village ... .""" In
response to Shetters' claim that the local option election constitutes
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,"9 the court
reasoned "[i]t is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to grant local communities the choice of whether to adopt the
state law."'191
In Sun v. State,'92 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of Alaska Statutes section 09.17.030, which denies recovery for
personal injuries incurred while in the act of committing a felo-
ny."9 Sun claimed that the statute authorizes the execution of any
criminal by the police with no recourse for the family, constituting
a violation of due process under Alaska's constitution. 94 Since
excessive use of force by a police officer remains subject to criminal
185. 832 P.2d 181 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 182.
188. Id.
189. Id at 182-83 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.496(b) (1986)).
190. Id. at 184 (relying on ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7, art. H, §8 14-15, art. XI,
§§ 1-4, 6-7).
191. Id.
192. 830 P.2d 772 (Alaska 1992).
193. Alaska Statutes section 09.17.030 provides:
A person who suffers personal injury or death may not recover damages
for the personal injury or death if the injuries or death occurred while the
person was engaged in the commission of a felony, the person has been
convicted of a felony, including conviction based upon a guilty plea or plea
of nolo contendere, and the felony substantially contributed to the injury
or death. This section does not affect a right of action under 42 U.S.C.
1983.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.030 (Supp. 1992).
194. Sun, 830 P.2d at 775.
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prosecution, 195 the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.030. The statute does not alter the
substantive law of arrest, and because significant sanctions exist to
redress the violation of this law of arrest, the court found no
deprivation of Sun's due process rights.196
In re A.S.W. and E.W. held a child's videotaped testimony
about sexual abuse by her father admissible at a Child in Need of
Aid (CINA) proceeding.'98 A state trooper and a social worker
conducted and videotaped a one-hour interview with the child
during which she was asked open-ended, non-leading questions.'"
There was, however, no cross-examination, and the child was not
specifically asked whether she had been coached.' The trial
court excused the child from testifying in person, ruling the
videotape admissible under the hearsay exception of Alaska Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(5)."' At the CINA proceeding, the father denied
all allegations of abuse and claimed that the use of the videotape
violated not only the aforementioned rule of evidence but also the
constitutional right to confront one's accuser.'w
The court found that the purpose of a CINA hearing is to
determine whether a child's well-being is jeopardized, not whether
conduct constituting child abuse under the law has occurred. 203
The father faced neither criminal punishment nor civil liability as a
result of the CINA proceeding.' Moreover, judges and not juries
are the triers of fact in CINA proceedings and are more capable of
weighing the evidence. 5 Thus, the supreme court held "in the
adjudicatory phase of a CINA proceeding, the alleged abuser's due
process right to examine the child is adequately protected by the
195. Id
196. Id.
197. 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).
198. Id. at 805.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 803-05.
203. Id. at 806.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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unavailability and reliability requirements of Evidence Rule
804. ,,2
In Kiester v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc.," the plaintiff
challenged the hospital's denial of surgical privileges. The supreme
court reasoned that hospitals should be allowed substantial discre-
tion to determine competency requirements, but due process dictates
that they not base the grant or denial of privileges on vague and
ambiguous standards, but rather on objective criteria.2" The court
concluded that due process demands that a denied applicant must
be notified "of the specific criteria which were determinative in the
denial and how the applicant failed to meet the hospital's expecta-
tions with regard to the criteria."'  Consequently, the defendant
should have noted the specific deficiencies in the plaintiff's training,
education, and demonstrated competence.210 The oral evaluations
needed to express more than just a negative opinion by explaining
how the plaintiff did not meet the standards set by the hospital.2
The supreme court remanded the application to the hospital for
reconsideration.212 The court denied the plaintiff's claim for
damages, however, and distinguished this case from one where a
surgeon who was granted permanent staff privileges had them
improperly revoked. In that case, the surgeon clearly had a
compensable "property right."21 3
C. Self-Incrimination
In State v. Gonzalez, 21 4 the court of appeals held that Alaska's
witness immunity statute violates the state's constitutional privilege
against self incrimination. -5 Alaska Statutes section 12.50.101(a)
provides that "no testimony or other information compelled under
... order, or information directly or indirectly derived from that
206. Id.
207. 843 P.2d 1219 (Alaska 1992).
208. Id. at 1233.
209. Id. at 1225.
210. Id at 1233.
211. Id. at 1226.
212. Id. at 1228.
213. Id.
214. 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
215. Id. at 936.
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testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in
a criminal case." '16 In affirming the superior court order, the
court found this "use and derivative use" standard of immunity
violates article I, section 9 of the Alaska constitution, which requires
"transactional immunity, 217 be granted to protect an individual's
privilege against self-incrimination.2 8
The court reasoned that the similarity between the Alaska
provision and that of the federal constitution, and the status of the
federal law in 1956 when the Alaska constitution was ratified,
mandated the higher standard.2 9 Although federal law now
recognizes use and derivative use immunity as equivalent to the self-
incrimination privilege, the Alaska delegates must have consciously
selected to implement transactional immunity.' Noting the
court's historical trend has been toward a broadening of individual
rights under Alaska's constitution, the court found that the state had
failed to offer any compelling arguments to support a narrower
interpretation of the provision."'
D. Right to Counsel
In Adams v. State, the court of appeals reversed the defen-
dant's assault conviction, concluding that his waiver of counsel
resulted in a due process violation.' TWo psychiatrists who
examined the defendant concluded that he was partially delusion-
al.' The trial judge, however, permitted him to waive counsel
and proceed pro se, relying on one doctor's characterization of the
delusions as limited to the facts of the case but not affecting the
ability to defend himself2 After the defendant was found guilty
and sentenced, appointed counsel contended that Adams lacked the
216. ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101(a) (1990).
217. "Transactional immunity" gives immunity to witnesses from prosecution for
offenses to which their compelled testimony relates. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY
751 (6th ed. 1990).
218. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d at 935.
219. Id. at 929.
220. See id. at 930.
221. Id. at 936.
222. 829 P.2d 1201 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
223. Id. at 1206.
224. Id. at 1203-04.
225. Id. at 1204.
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minimum competency necessary to present his own defense and was
thus unable to validly waive the right to counsel. 6
The court of appeals extended the current Faretta-Mc-
Crackenm test and held defendants whose paranoid delusions
affect their perception of the evidence and impair the ability to
appreciate the extent of their own disability cannot conduct their
own defense.' In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bryner
emphasized that the articulated test for waiver of procedural rights
does not create a differing standard from that for determining
competency to proceed. 9 He understood the rationale underlying
the majority opinion to be that Adams did not make a knowing and
intelligent waiver because his decision to waive counsel was affected
by his mental illness.?
In Carr v. State,- the court of appeals considered whether
the prosection obtained statements made by the defendant over the
telephone to his wife in violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel z2 An Alaska State Trooper
contacted the defendant's wife and requested her cooperation in
gaining information from Carr, who was suspected of sexually
molesting the wife's child from a previous relationship. 3  The
wife agreed and placed a telephone call to Carr, which was recorded
pursuant to a valid warrant.' Carr admitted to sexually abusing
the child?" The state trooper met with Carr and obtained further
admissions from the defendant following the administration of
226. Id. at 1205.
227. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,821 (1975); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d
85, 91 (Alaska 1974). The court construed these cases to hold that the average
criminal defendant must be allowed self-representation if the trial court makes a
careful inquiry in which it determines that: (1) the defendant understands his right
to counsel, (2) the defendant is determined to forego that right, and (3) the
defendant can conduct his defense without being unusually disruptive. Adams, 829
P.2d at 1205; see Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
228. Adams, 829 P.2d at 1206.
229. IdL at 1207.
230. Id.
231. 840 P.2d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1002.
234. Id
235. Id
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Miranda warnings." Carr subsequently moved to suppress these
statements.237
Carr initially claimed the telephone conversation was a
custodial interrogation, which should have been preceded by a
reading of his Miranda rights." s The court of appeals recognized
Carr's incriminating statements to his wife were the fruits of a police
interrogation, as her call was intended to elicit such statements for
the benefit of the state police.239 The court nevertheless held that
this call did not rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" for
the purposes of Miranda.2' The telephone interrogation did not
involve formal questioning or a personal confrontation with a police
officer, the defendant was free to accept, reject, and break off the
conversation at any time, and the defendant's incarceration arose
from a wholly unrelated crime. 4 Under these circumstances, the
court found no possibility that the incriminating statements resulted
from the coercive "'interaction of custody and official interroga-
tion.'
242
Carr also contended that the state violated his right to counsel
under the Alaska constitution243 during both the telephone call
and subsequent personal interview' As a party in a separate
CINA proceeding related to a child abuse investigation, he claimed
he was entitled to have his court-appointed attorney for the child
custody proceedings present for purposes of the criminal investiga-
tion as well.24 The court of appeals rejected his argument for
several reasons. First, the right to counsel does not attach until the
state takes some adversarial action that transforms the suspect into
an "accused" in a criminal prosecution.2' In the present case, the
court found that the defendant's incriminating statements were
procured during the early stages of the investigation; no charges had
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1003.
239. Id
240. IdM
241. Id. at 1004.
242. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)).
243. See ALAsKA CONSr. art. I, § 11.
244. Carr, 840 P.2d at 1005.
245. Id.
246. I&
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yet been ffled.247 The CINA proceeding, moreover, was not
sufficiently connected with the current child abuse investigation.2'
The custody proceedings began months before the criminal
investigation, the allegations of molestation were not litigated in the
CINA case, and in the CINA case the defendant had no parental
rights over the allegedly abused child because he was not her
natural father.249
V. CRIMINAL LAW
The Alaska Court of Appeals considered a great number of
criminal law cases in 1992. The decisions are separated into the
categories of constitutional protections and general criminal law,
with further specifity in each. Some overlap in subject matter exists
between this section and the section summarizing cases in general
constitutional law.'
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure In Beauvois v. State,' the defendant
was convicted of robbery in the first degree after a police officer
conducted an investigative stop of the car in which defendant was
riding. 2  At trial Beauvois moved to suppress all evidence
gleaned from the investigative stop, arguing that it was unlawful
because the officer had no information to link the car or its
occupants to the recent robbery. 3 On appeal, the court affirmed
the conviction, recognizing the "authority of the police to conduct
investigative stops of potential witnesses to a recent criminal
occurrence, even when there is no reason to believe that the person
stopped participated in the crime. '  The circumstances sur-
rounding the stop justified prompt investigation: a serious felony
had just occurred in the vicinity, it was three o'clock in the morning,
this was the only car driving through the area where the suspect had
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id. at 1005-06.
250. See supra part IV.
251. 837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
252. Id. at 1120.
253. Id. at 1121.
254. Id. (citing Metzker v. State, 797 P.2d 1219 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)).
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fled, and the officer could have reasonably believed that the car's
occupants had seen something that could have assisted in the
investigation. 5
In Barron v. State, 6 a police officer observed the defendant
and another individual in a public restroom stall and suspected an
illegal drug transaction was in progress.' The officer arrested
both men and seized a plastic bag from the toilet containing packets
of cocaine. 8 Barron contended he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a closed restroom stall, and thus the officer's actions
and the evidence taken from the scene constituted an illegal
seizure." Holding that Coleman v. State" justified the officer's
seizure, 1 the court of appeals recognized that a person in a public
restroom has a reasonable expectation of privacy but reasoned that
the expectation is limited because others who enter the public area
may observe that person.262 Moreover, the court observed: "When
a police officer who is in a public area observes two people using
the same restroom stall, and apparently not using the stall for its
intended purpose, then these observations may permit the police
officer to take further reasonable steps to investigate."2"
In Chandler v. State,264 the police seized Chandler's bag at the
Ketchikan airport and took it to the police station. Ninety
minutes after the seizure, the police obtained a warrant authorizing
them to search the bag, which contained five ounces of cocaine.2
The defendant argued that the police's actions amounted to a full-
255. Id.
256. 823 P.2d 17 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 18-19. From outside the stall, the officer noticed four feet inside the
stall and also recognized that the feet were far away from the commode. Id. at 18.
258. Id. at 19.
259. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 14.
260. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976) (concluding that a police officer can temporarily
detain a person when "the officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public
danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred").
261. Barron, 823 P.2d at 21.
262. Id. at 20.
263. Id.
264. 830 P.2d 789 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
265. Id- at 791.
266. Id.
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scale seizure of his property requiring a showing of probable
cause.2 7 The state contended that the seizure involved a minimal-
ly intrusive detention requiring only reasonable suspicion.'
The court of appeals found that the length of detention in this
case exceeded the ninety minute limit for investigative detentions
established in United States v. Place.69 The court further reasoned
other factors also suggested that this detention amounted to a full-
scale seizure, including the fact that the luggage was taken directly
from the defendant's person and that it was transported a significant
distance from the place of seizure.27 Thus, probable cause was
necessary to support this warrantless seizure. 7' Neither the
defendant's nervous behavior nor the police officers suspicion that
the defendant was a drug dealer "approach[ed] the level of certainty
necessary to establish probable cause."'
The defendants in Newhall v. State273 challenged the validity
of a search leading to their convictions for misconduct involving a
controlled substance in the third degree. The police obtained a
warrant authorizing a search for alcohol in a package addressed to
the defendantsY4 Inside the package, a police officer found a
second package that he knew from its weight could not contain
alcohol. Nevertheless, the officer opened the second package and
discovered marijuana z5
The trial court relied on Reeves v. State276 to uphold the
search of the inside package, reasoning that its contents were in
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983).
270. Chandler, 830 P.2d at 792.
271. Id. at 796.
272. Id. The police knew of charges against the defendant that had been
dismissed over two years ago. The police also relied upon information about
Chandler's drug-related activity stemming from an interview with an informant
whom the court of appeals found failed to satisfy the reliability prong of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id. at 794-95. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
273. 843 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
274. Id. at 1256.
275. Id.
276. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
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plain view." In Reeves, a correctional officer searched a balloon
found in the pocket of the defendant and discovered that it
contained contraband.278 The Alaska Supreme Court held such a
search and seizure to be lawful, stating "the opaque quality of the
balloon does not preclude a plain view seizure... [if] supported by
the requisite probable cause."279 The court of appeals in Newhall
held Reeves to be inconsistent with federal law insofar as Reeves
authorized the search of closed containers based on mere probable
cause.' Instead, the court concluded that under federal law, the
plain view doctrine entitled police to open a package only if "the
contents of the container were identifiable to a virtual certainty.
The police are required to have more than probable cause.""1
In Fox v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence for misconduct involving a
controlled substance.W Fox challenged the superior court's failure
to suppress evidence, claiming it was the fruit of unlawful electronic
monitoring. The police had secured a warrant to monitor and
record a sale of cocaine by the defendant's brother to undercover
agents. The defendant's brother failed to appear, the defendant
himself completed the transaction, and the agents recorded the
sale.
While agreeing with the defendant that the initial warrant did
not authorize recording the transaction with the defendant, the court
of appeals nevertheless held that the warrant requirement was
waived due to exigent circumstances.2 The court found the
warrantless search to be justified by the unanticipated absence of
277. Newhall, 843 P.2d at 1257.
278. Reeves, 599 P.2d at 730.
279. Id. at 739-40.
280. Newhall, 843 P.2d at 1259. The court of appeals concluded, however, that
Reeves was consistent with federal law in allowing a temporary seizure based upon
probable cause. Id.
281. Id.
282. 825 P.2d 938 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 938-39. Based upon these events, the police arranged a second buy
with Fox, obtained a second warrant and made another purchase. Id. at 939.
285. Id. The court applied the Fox rationale to a similar situation in the later
case of Pruitt v. State, 829 P.2d 1197 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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the defendant's brother and the unforeseen intervention of the
defendant.?
In Marsh v. State,' the defendant appealed his conviction for
driving with a revoked license. He contended the evidence of his
identity and his revoked license should have been suppressed since
they were obtained during an unjustified investigative stop. s A
state trooper observed the defendant's automobile apparently stalled
on the side of the road and stopped to give assistance. 2 9 He then
discovered the defendant's identity and that his license had been
revoked.2'
Relying upon Ozhuwan v. State,291 the court held such an
investigative stop is permissible when there is "'a legitimate reason
to be concerned for the welfare of the motorist.""'2  The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the officer's actions could
not be justified under the assistance rationale since the car started
as the officer pulled up.293 The officer had already initiated the
investigative stop and thus was authorized to request the defendant's
license.294
2. Miscellaneous. The court of appeals reversed the defen-
dant's conviction of sexual abuse of a minor in Wood v. State,295
due to a trial court ruling that effectively precluded the defendant
from exercising his constitutional right to cross-examine a wit-
ness.296  The alleged victim of the abuse served as the state's
primary witness.21 The witness, however, had himself been
accused of sexually abusing a minor and had entered into a "conduct
286. Fox, 825 P.2d at 939.
287. 838 P.2d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
288. Id. at 820.
289. Id The trooper activated his overhead lights as he pulled up behind the
defendant's car, an action which the court assumed arguendo resulted in an
investigative stop. Id
290. Id.
291. 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
292. Marsh, 838 P.2d at 820 (quoting Ozhuwan, 786 P.2d at 922).
293. Id. at 820-21.
294. Id. at 821.
295. 837 P.2d 743 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
296. Id. at 744; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
297. Wood, 837 P.2d at 745.
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agreement" whereby the state agreed to defer delinquency
proceedings for one year and then dismiss the charges if he
maintained good behavior2 98 The defense argued that the agree-
ment may have motivated the witness to accuse Wood falsely."9
The trial judge disallowed any questions relating to the conduct
agreement, finding the probative value of the evidence to be
outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.'
Relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Alaska," the court of appeals emphasized that inquiry into a
witness's bias or motivation is a permissible and important use of
the constitutional right of confrontation.3" Because he was not
allowed to establish the existence of the conduct agreement, the
defendant could not effectively inquire into the witness's possible
bias.'
In Fee v. State,' the arresting officer had interpreted Fee's
unwillingness to take a breathalyzer test without the presence of his
attorney as a refusal.05 The court found that Fee's statements,
which indicated that his refusal stemmed from the mistaken belief
that his Miranda rights entitled him to presence of counsel, triggered
the Graham rule.31 The court of appeals held that the rule of
Graham, which involved "an administrative appeal of a civil driver's
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
302. Wood, 837 P.2d at 745-46; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONsT. art.
I, § 11.
303. Wood, 837 P.2d at 747. The court of appeals also reasoned that the trial
judge's concern with the potential prejudice that could result from informing the
jury of the charges pending against the witness could have been averted by limiting
defense's inquiry about the nature of the agreement. Id at 748.
304. 825 P.2d 464 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
305. Id. at 465.
306. Id at 465-66. "The Graham rule applies only in those cases in which the
arrestee has been advised of his or her Miranda rights prior to being asked to
submit to chemical testing." Id at 465 (citation omitted). The Graham court held:
[W]here an arrested person refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test, the
administering officer must inquire into the nature of the refusal and, if it
appears that the refusal is based on a confusion about a person's rights, the
officer must clearly advise that person that the rights contained in the
Miranda warning do not apply to the breathalyzer examination.
Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211, 215 (Alaska 1981).
204 [Vol. 10:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
license revocation," also applied to cases involving criminal charges
for refusal to submit to chemical testing. 7  While the court
agreed Fee had met his burden of proof under Graham, it found
that the district court erroneously concluded that the arresting
officer had also sustained his burden of providing a clear explana-
tion under the rule." The court held "it is not enough for the
officer to advise the arrestee that the breath test is mandatory; the
officer must also specifically explain that.., the Miranda rights to
silence and to the presence of counsel do not apply to the breath
test. 3
09
In Edwards v. State31° the court of appeals reversed the trial
court determination that the defendant made his statement
voluntarily and was not in "custody" for Miranda purposes when
interviewed at the police station.31 ' Relying upon the objective
test announced by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hunter v. State,311
the court of appeals found that a reasonable person in Edwards'
position would not have felt free to break off questioning.3 13 The
police officer "had plainly told Edwards that his freedom to leave
the police station was conditioned on his willingness to answer the
officers' questions., 3 4 Because this threat transformed the inter-
view into a custodial interrogation, the court held that his statement
must be suppressed.315 The court remanded the case to clarify the
status of other evidence in order to determine whether this Miranda
violation constituted harmless error or required reversal of Edward's
first-degree murder conviction.3 16
In George v. State,317 the court of appeals held that the
defendant's statements were admissible despite police officer's
307. Fee, 825 P.2d at 465.
308. Id. at 466.
309. Id. (footnote omitted).
310. 842 P.2d 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
311. Id. at 1284.
312. 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979).
313. Edwards, 842 P.2d at 1285 (citing Hunter, 590 P.2d at 895).
314. Id.
315. Id. The court rejected, however, the defendant's contention that his
statement was also involuntary. Id.
316. Id. at 1285-86.
317. 836 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
1993]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
noncompliance with the rule of Stephan v. State,318 which held
Alaska due process requires electronic recording of "custodial
interrogations in a place of detention, including the giving of the
accused's Miranda rights .... ."119 The George court held "[t]he
fact that the Metlakatla police did not have a functioning tape
recorder . . . excuses non-compliance with the Stephan rule."32
The court further noted that in order for the Stephan rule to
operate, the defendant must make some suggestion that his
statement was presented inaccurately or that the police had acted
improperly.21 In this case, the defendant failed to introduce any
such evidence.3"
B. General Criminal Law
1. Evidence. In Birch v. State,3z a defendant convicted of
driving while intoxicated argued that the results of a blood test
performed at his request and by the State Crime Lab should have
been suppressed." The defendant's attorney advised him to have
an independent blood test done, but the defendant could not afford
the fee. A state trooper told Birch he could have his blood sample
drawn at state expense.32s The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court determination that the rationale of Oines v. State326 did not
apply.327 In Oines, the court had held that the results of a blood
test performed by a hired expert were privileged under Alaska's
lawyer client-evidentiary rule.3' Birch, however, did not involve
any confidential communications between the lawyer and the
lawyer's representative, that is, the lab technician.329 Since the
state only seized one of the two vials of blood, Birch's attorney was
318. IaM at 962 (citing Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985)).
319. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1162.
320. George, 836 P.2d at 962 (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164).
321. Id (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1165).
322. Id.
323. 825 P.2d 901 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
324. Id. at 902.
325. Id.
326. 803 P.2d 884 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
327. Birch, 825 P.2d at 903.
328. Oines, 803 P.2d at 886 (citing ALAsKA R. EVID. 503).
329. Birch, 82.5 P.2d at 903.
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not hindered from consulting experts and the attorney-client
privilege was not violated.33
In Shakespeare v. State,331 the court of appeals held out-of-
court statements made by the defendant's wife332 to a police
officer following assurances of protection from prosecution were not
admissible under the statement against interest exception to the
hearsay rule.333 Instead, the court determined the correct inquiry
under Rule 804(b)(3) is "whether the statement so far tended to
subject [the declarant] to criminal liability that a reasonable person
in her position would not have made the statement unless she
believed it to be true."3" The court concluded that a reasonable
person would have construed the officer's assurances as a promise
against prosecution, and thus would not believe her statements to be
against her self-interest.3
2. Criminal Procedure. The court of appeals in Willie v.
State336 held that before denying an unopposed suppression
motion, a judge must give "the defendant notice of the intended
denial, accompanied by an explanation of the judge's reasoning, and
an opportunity to supplement the factual assertions of the original
suppression motion."' 7  After supplementation of the original
motion, if the factual assertions contained in the suppression motion
330. 1& at 903.
331. 827 P.2d 454 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
332. While the defendant asserted the spousal privilege, the trial judge permitted
the state to admit the statements through the testimony of the interviewing officer.
Id. at 457.
333. Id. at 470; see also ALASKA R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
334. Shakespeare, 827 P.2d at 458.
335. Id. The officer told the declarant that he was not interested in prosecuting
her and would not "throw her in jail" if she told the truth. Id.
336. 829 P.2d 310 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
337. Id. at 313. An opposing party who does not respond to the filing of a
motion violates Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 40(d). Id. at 312 (citing
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(d)). The court noted, however, that where the motion is
routine, "the trial court is generally authorized to construe the opposing party's
failure to respond as non-opposition and to grant the motion if the relief request
appears justified." I- The court can also deny a clearly frivolous motion that
remains unopposed. Id.
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remain insufficient to justify relief, the judge may then deny the
motion.33
In Wallace v. State,339 the court of appeals held Alaska Rule
of Criminal Procedure 25(d) does not apply to a probation revoca-
tion proceeding.' " Relying upon State v. Sears,.M 1 the court
determined that probation revocation proceedings are not criminal
proceedings.' 42 Thus the defendant's right to a peremptory
disqualification of the judge was governed by Alaska Civil Rule
42(c),' 3 which did not entitle the defendant to bring a peremptory
challenge appeal prior to the conclusion of the proceeding.3
In Sharp v. State, 5 the defendant argued that the superior
court had erred in rejoining four counts of sexual abuse of a minor
for trial and an additional count for failure to appear.' Prior to
his original trial date, the superior court had granted the defendant's
motion to sever Count IV of the indictment, relying on Johnson v.
State.'4? In Johnson, the appellate court held that a defendant was
entitled to severance in cases where only the circumstance of the
similar nature of the charged offenses warranted joinder, even if the
prosecution would produce the same evidence at separate trials.3 8
338. Id. at 313.
339. 829 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
340. Id at 1210; see ALASKA R. CRM. P. 25(d) (establishing change of judge as
a matter of right).
341. 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976).
342. Wallace, 829 P.2d at 1210 (citing Sears, 553 P.2d at 910).
343. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 42(c)(4) provides in pertinent part:
(4) A party waives the right to change as a matter of right a judge who
has been permanently assigned to the case by knowingly participating
before that judge in:
(i) Any judicial proceeding which concerns the merits of the
action and involves the consideration of evidence or affidavits
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 42(c)(4). Wallace had previously appeared before the judge to
make admissions to the petition before mounting his challenge. Wallace, 829 P.2d
at 1209.
344. Id at 1210. Prior to final judgment on the probation revocation, the
defendant only has the remedy of petitioning the court of appeals to hear this issue
as an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1211.
345. 837 P.2d 718 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
346. Id. at 724.
347. 730 P.2d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
348. Id. at 176-77.
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Several days before the original trial date, 9 the legislature amend-
ed Alaska Criminal Rule of Procedure 8(a) to allow "joinder of
similar offenses if the government can demonstrate before trial that
evidence of each offense will likely be cross-admissible."3 0 The
court of appeals upheld the superior court's determination that the
amendment effectively overruled Johnson and no longer entitled the
defendant to automatic severance.35'
In Miles v. State, 2 the defendant and the State reached a plea
agreement in which the defendant pled no contest to a charge of
third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and
preserved his right to appeal the superior court's denial of his
motions to suppress the tape recordings of his conversations with an
undercover officer.5 3  The court of appeals held that such an
agreement goes beyond Cooksey v. State as limited by Oveson
v. Anchorage.5
Whether a motion to suppress involves a "dispositive" determi-
nation does not rest upon whether the state would have declined to
prosecute in the absence of certain evidence.356 "[A]n issue is
'dispositive' for Cooksey purposes only if resolution of the issue in
the defendant's favor would either legally preclude the government
from pursuing the prosecution or would leave the government
without sufficient evidence to survive a motion for judgment of
acquittal ... ,,31 The state would still have had substantial and
349. The trial court vacated the defendant's original trial date after Sharp
feigned his own suicide and fled the state. Sharp, 837 P.2d at 722. He was later
recaptured and a new date was set. IL
350. Id. at 724 (citing ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 8(a)).
351. Id.
352. 825 P.2d 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
353. UL at 905.
354. 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974) (allowing a defendant to plead no contest and
also to reserve the right to appeal a dispositive issue ruled upon in the trial court).
355. Miles, 825 P.2d at 906 (citing Oveson v. Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 803 nA
(Alaska 1978) (holding that "appeals under the Cooksey doctrine will not be
approved unless it is clearly shown... that.., resolution of the issue reserved for
appeal will be dispositive of the entire case.")).
356. Miles, 825 P.2d at 905.
357. Id. at 906.
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sufficient evidence to bring the case to the jury, despite suppression
of the tapes.35 8
In Bloomquist v. State,359 the defendant argued that the
superior court erroneously denied his request to reopen his case so
he could testify on his own behalf 3 ° The superior court had ruled
"that Bloomquist had personally waived his right to testify after a
full opportunity to consult with his attorney. '361 The court adopt-
ed the standards announced by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Walker,3 62 and listed four factors to consider in deciding whether
to reopen the case:
(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the character and impor-
tance of the testimony the party desires to present; (3) the effect
of granting the motion, [and in] particular[ any prejudice to the
state's case; and (4) the reasonableness of the grounds asserted
for the request to reopen the evidence, as contrasted with
evidence that the defendant's motion was motivated by a desire
to "delay the proceedings" or to "gain a strategic advantage over
the government."
In Moss v. Alaska,3 4 the defendant challenged his conviction
on four counts of criminal contempt, which stemmed from the
defendant's past willful noncompliance with a superior court order
to pay child support.3  Six months prior to the filing of the
criminal information against the defendant, the attorney general's
office had filed a motion for an order to show cause why the
defendant should not be held in civil contempt for his failure to pay
child support.3  On appeal, the defendant maintained that his
criminal case should have been dismissed for violation of his right
to a speedy trial under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 45,367
358. Ik The court reasoned that the undercover agent could still testify about
the transactions and could provide the necessary foundation for admission of the
drugs into evidence. Id. (citing State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 877, 880 (Alaska
1978)).
359. 832 P.2d 177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
360. Id. at 179. The defendant had not previously testified. Id.
361. Id.
362. 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985).
363. Bloomquist, 832 P.2d at 180 (citing Walker, 772 F.2d at 1177-85).
364. 834 P.2d 1256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
365. Id. at 1257-58.
366. Id. at 1258.
367. Rule 45(c)(1) states that the trial must begin within 120 days, running
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because "the civil contempt proceeding was tantamount to an
arraignment on the criminal charges."3" According to the defen-
dant, the time limit should have started to run when he was served
with the motion in the civil case.
369
The court of appeals found the civil contempt proceeding
constituted a separate civil matter to which no right to a speedy trial
attached under Rule 45.370 The court distinguished the civil
contempt proceedings, which the state initiated to compel future
compliance, from the criminal contempt proceedings, through which
the superior court intended to punish the defendant for past willful
noncompliance with court orders.3 '
Petersen v. Alaska372 also involved a Rule 45 issue. Prior to
trial, the superior court twice permitted the defendant to change his
plea of no contest to a plea of not guilty.373 Peterson subsequently
moved to dismiss the charges, alleging a violation of his right to trial
within 120 days of arrest.374 The trial court denied this motion
after allowing for various excludable periods under Rule 45(d) 75
The court of appeals held that the reinstatement of the
defendant's not guilty plea did not immediately trigger the resump-
tion of the Rule 45 countdown.376 The court reasoned that the
state terminated active prosecution on the entry of a no contest
plea.3' Thus, the court adopted the rule of Sundberg 11,378 al-
lowing a court to exclude an additional thirty-day period under Rule
45 when a defendant changes a plea of no contest to one of not
guilty.
"[firom the date the defendant is arrested, initially arraigned or from the date the
charge (complaint, indictment, or information) is first served upon the defendant,
whichever is first." ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(c)(1).
368. Moss, 834 P.2d at 1258.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1259.
371. Id. at 1258-59.
372. 838 P.2d 812 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 813-14; see also ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 45(d).
376. Peterson, 838 P.2d at 815.
377. Id.
378. Sundberg v. State, 667 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (Sundberg I1).
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3. Sentencing. In Curtis v. State,379 the defendant was incor-
rectly sentenced as a first-time DWI offender. Curtis contended
that the district court was authorized to modify his sentence only to
the extent necessary to correct the error. Therefore, he argued that
the district court should have suspended the minimum fine for a
second offense to the extent that he had already complied with the
original judgment. The court of appeals agreed and remanded the
case, holding that because Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(c)38
"does not restrict a sentencing court from suspending all or part of
the mandatory minimum fine, the court retains this power. 381
This decision clarified the earlier case of Dunham v. Juneau,3s
which had implied that no part of a mandated minimum fine could
be suspended.3s
In State v. Wagner,3s the court of appeals addressed the first
impression issue of whether the statutorily created three-judge
sentencing panel3' must abide by Alaska's mandatory sentencing
provisions. After the panel concurred in the superior court's finding
of a non-statutory mitigating factor, it sentenced Wagner to
379. 831 P.2d 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
380. Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(c) was repealed in 1990. The substance
of that provision is now contained in Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(b)(2)(A)
which provides:
(2) the court may not
(A) suspend execution of sentence or grant probation except
on condition that the person serve the minimum imprisonment
[provided] under (1) of this subsection ....
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991).
381. Curtis, 831 P.2d at 361.
382. 790 P.2d 239 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
383. Id. at 240-41.
384. 835 P.2d 454 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
385. The scheme of the three-judge panel is set out in Alaska Statutes section
12.55.175. Alaska Statutes section 12.55.165 establishes the panel's jurisdiction,
providing in relevant part:
Extraordinary circumstances: If the defendant is subject to sentencing
under AS 12.55.125 (q), (d), (e), or (i) [presumptive sentencing statutes]
and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice
would result from failure to consider relevant aggravating or mitigating
factors not specifically included in AS 12.55.155 [defining mitigating and
aggravating factors] or from imposition of the presumptive term... the
court shall enter findings and conclusions and cause a record to be
transmitted to a three-judge panel for sentencing under AS 12.55.175,
ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.165 (1990).
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concurrent terms of eight years with three years suspended on two
counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor. The panel concluded
that the mandatory sentencing provisions of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.025(h) "applied only to sentences imposed by individual judges
and did not restrict the sentencing powers of the three-judge
panel. , 386
The court of appeals found that the legislature restricted the
panel's jurisdictional authority to presumptive sentencing cases.31
Thus, while the panel is free to depart from the presumptive
sentencing mandates, the panel has no authority to deviate from
sentencing restrictions of statutes unrelated to Alaska's presumptive
sentencing laws.3" Enacted independently of the presumptive
sentencing laws, the consecutive sentence provision governs not the
length of sentences, but how sentences are imposed. This reasoning
led the court to note that "compliance with AS 12.55.025(h) would
not have precluded the three-judge panel from imposing a compos-
ite sentence that was in substance identical to the sentence it
imposed by use of concurrent terms. 38 9
In Briggs v. Donnelly,390 the court of appeals reviewed the
lower court's judgment that the Department of Corrections (DOC)
did not have the authority to forfeit a prisoner's "good time"
because of misconduct that occurred before his resentencing on the
same offense.39' At issue were interpretations of Alaska Statutes
sections 33.20.010(a) and 33.20.050.31 The defendant contended
386. Wagner, 835 P.2d at 455.
387. Id. at 7. "The three-judge panel is uniquely a creature of presumptive
sentencing." Id. at 456.
388. Wagner, 835 P.2d at 457.
389. Id.
390. 828 P.2d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
391. Id. Donnelly's original conviction was reversed. He was subsequently
convicted again after a retrial and resentenced.
392. Alaska Statutes section 33.20.010(a) provides in relevant part:
... a prisoner convicted of an offense against the state and sentenced to
a term of imprisonment that exceeds three days is entitled to a deduction
of one-third of the term of imprisonment rounded off to the nearest day
if the prisoner follows the rules of the correctional facility in which the
prisoner is confined.
ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010(a) (1986).
Alaska Statutes section 33.20.050 provides:
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that upon resentencing, he began with a clean slate and was
automatically entitled to a deduction of one-third of his term of
imprisonment under Alaska Statutes section 33.20.010(a).
The court noted that the defendant's interpretation would allow
prisoners to reap "the windfall of having the DOC retroactively lose
their ability to use the good-time statutes to reward and punish
prisoners in the manner the legislature obviously intended."393
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that Donnelly
was subject to forfeiture of good time based upon his entire term of
imprisonment, and the defendant's "term of imprisonment" included
time served under his original sentence.394
The lower court in Mancini v. State95 sentenced the defendant
to consecutive terms totaling ten years, with one year suspended, for
the convictions of theft in the second degree and sexual abuse of a
minor in the second degree.396 The court of appeals first held that
the lower court erred in finding defendant subject to the aggravating
factor provided in Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155(c)(15), which
applies if "the defendant has three or more felony convictions. ''31
The defendant argued only two of his out-of-state felony convictions
constituted prior felony convictions under Alaska law. 398
The court of appeals agreed. Holding the statutory definition
of "prior felony conviction" in Alaska Statutes section
If during the term of imprisonment a prisoner commits an offense or
violates the rules of the correctional facility, all or part of the prisoner's
good time may be forfeited under regulations adopted by the commissioner
of corrections. The amount of good time forfeited shall be related to the
severity of the offense or rule violation.
ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.050(a) (1986).
393. Donnelly, 828 P.2d at 1209.
394. Id.
395. 841 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
396. The charges were unrelated but were consolidated for sentencing after
defendant entered pleas of no contest. Id. at 186.
397. Id. at 188-89. The court initially affirmed the lower court's decision to
impose consecutive sentences and to reject a mitigating factor proposed by
defendant. Id. at 189.
398. IM. at 188. Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(2), a presumptive
sentencing statute, provides in relevant part: "a conviction in this or another
jurisdiction of an offense having elements similar to those of a felony defined as
such under Alaska law at the time the offense was committed is considered a prior
felony conviction." ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1990).
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12.55.145(a)(2) applicable to aggravating factor (c)(15), the court of
appeals concluded that because only two of Mancini's prior
convictions would be prior felony convictions under Alaska law,
aggravating factor (c)(15) could not be triggered in this case.3
Pleading no contest to the offense of driving while intoxicated
(DWI), the defendant in State v. Peel' contended that his 1986
Louisiana DWI conviction should not operate to classify the
defendant as a second time DWI offender, since under Louisiana
law, defendants charged with criminal offenses carrying a penalty of
no more than six months do not have the right to a jury trial. 1
Because trial by jury is a core constitutional right in Alaska, the
court of appeals held that the trial court correctly disregarded Peel's
prior conviction and sentenced him as a first-time offender.'
In Andrew v. State, 3 the court of appeals held that when a
probation violation is the sole basis for a finding of extraordinary
circumstances justifying deviation from the Austin rule,' the
conduct amounting to the violation must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.' 5 Although the defendant had been acquit-
ted on charges of homicide, the superior court concluded that for
purposes of probation revocation,' his guilt had been established
by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court then held that
the homicide constituted an extraordinary circumstance for
sentencing purposes under the Austin rule.
The court of appeals held the rationale underlying the Austin
rule continues to apply in probation revocation proceedings."° A
probation violation can be established by meeting the preponder-
ance of the evidence test. f, however, the court relies upon the
399. Mancini, 841 P.2d at 189.
400. 843 P.2d 1249 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
401. Id. at 1250.
402. Id, at 1251.
403. 835 P.2d 1251 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
404. The Austin rule provides that "[n]ormally a first offender should receive a
more favorable sentence than the presumptive term for a second offender ...."
Id at 1252 (quoting Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657, 657-58 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981)).
405. Id. at 1253.
406. Andrew was a first felony offender who received a suspended sentence and
was placed on probation for four years. Id.
407. Id. at 1254.
408. Id
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violation of probation conditions to justify departure from the
Austin rule in imposing sentence, that violation must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence.'
The court of appeals, cautioned, however, that:
[t]he absence of clear and convincing evidence of a probation
violation does not automatically bar the court from imposing a
sentence exceeding the Austin limit .... rather, the finding of
a violation by a mere preponderance of evidence will rule out an
exceptional sentence only when the violation itself provides the
exclusive ground for exceeding the... limit.4 10
If the totality of the circumstances amounts to clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant has poor potential for rehabilitation, the
trial court is justified in exceeding the Austin limit. Thus, the court
of appeals in Andrew found that the extraordinary circumstance in
this case was not the defendant's probable involvement in a
homicide, but rather his poor prospects for rehabilitation.4 1
The court of appeals held in Kelly v. State412 that when
probation is revoked, any duties and obligations imposed as
conditions of probation necessarily terminate as well.413 After
receiving a suspended sentence for her conviction of criminal
mischief in the second degree, Kelly was placed on probation and
as a special condition of that probation was ordered to pay
restitution to injured parties. 414 The court of appeals found that
although the sentencing judge had authority to order restitution as
an independent aspect of defendant's sentence,4 5 the judge had
instead imposed restitution as a condition of her probation. The
court of appeals held that when the probationary status was
revoked, so were all of the obligations conditioned upon that
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1255.
411. Id. The court of appeals remanded the case, finding that the trial court may
have misunderstood that under Austin, a first offender is entitled to a "more
favorable sentence than the presumptive sentence of a second offender." The court
apparently began with the premise that an equivalent sentence would be permissible
without a finding of extraordinary circumstances. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Austin, 627 P.2d at 657-58).
412. 842 P.2d 612 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
413. Id. at 614.
414. Id. at 613.
415. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(a)(1990).
216 [Vol. I0:I
YEAR IN REVIEW
status.416 To order restitution would violate "the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy which mandates that 'once a
sentence has been meaningfully imposed, it may not, at a later time,
be increased."'417
In j.TS. v. State,41 8 the juvenile defendant had a background
of continuous offenses and failed placements. Nonetheless, the
court of appeals maintained institutionalization of a juvenile must
remain a last resort.419 Moreover, a court must "affirmatively
determine that less restrictive options will probably not accomplish
the goals of rehabilitation and protection of the public." 420
In Perotti v. State,42' the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's classification of the youthful defendant as a "worst offender"
for sentencing on a first degree murder conviction.4' A fellow
high school student was rumored to have assaulted Perotti's
girlfriend, and Perotti shot the student execution style and then
burned the body. The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the case law justifies such a finding only where the offender acted
either gratuitously or for pecuniary gain.4' The court held that a
maximum term could still be warranted although a defendant had
acted for personal satisfaction rather than for pecuniary gain.424
4. Miscellaneous. In Wesolic v. State,4' the court of appeals
affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss a first-
degree burglary charge. After waiting for his landlord to leave,
Wesolic, who rented a room in the same house, broke into the
rooms and stole property, including firearms.4' The court found:
(1) the locked bedrooms and garage in the house where defendant
416. Kelly, 842 P.2d at 614.
417. Id. (quoting Sonnier v. State, 483 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Alaska 1971)).
418. 825 P.2d 461 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
419. Id. at 464; see Alaska Delinquency Rule 23(d).
420. J.T.S., 825 P.2d at 464.
421. 843 P.2d 649 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
422. Id. at 651.
423. Id. at 650.
424. Id. at 651.
425. 837 P.2d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
426. 1& at 131.
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rented a room constituted a separate building,4' and (2) the first-
degree burglary statute encompasses situations where the burglar
steals a firearm during the course of a burglary.4"
In Cole v. Alaska,429 the defendant appealed his conviction of
the misdemeanor offense of operating machinery or equipment
within ten feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or
conductor.4" In dicta, the court of appeals declined to allow
comparative negligence principles to create an affirmative defense
to a criminal charge.43' However, the court reversed Cole's
conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury to convict if it found Cole acted with criminal negligence.432
In challenging the court's mens rea instructions, the defendant urged
the court of appeals to infer a standard of recklessness into Alaska
Statutes section 18.60.670. While the court acknowledged a history
of reading a negligence requirement into regulatory statutes
establishing misdemeanors,433 it held that with standard criminal
offenses where the statute does not specify the mens rea, reckless-
ness, and not negligence, should be the requisite culpable mental
state.434
427. Id. at 132. Alaska Statutes section 11.46.310(a) provides "[a] person
commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if the person enters or remains
unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime in the building." ALASKA
STAT. § 11.46.310 (1989).
428. Wesolic, 837 P.2d at 132; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.300 (1989) (first-
degree burglary statute).
429. 828 P.2d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
430. Id. at 176.
431. Cole, 828 P.2d at 177. Cole contended that the power line he hit was below
the National Electric Safety Code height requirement. The court found, however,
that even if it were to allow the affirmative defense, his conviction would
nevertheless stand because he was not charged with hitting the line, but with
operating within ten feet of the line. Id.
432. Id. at 178.
433. See Gregory v. State, 717 P.2d 428 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
criminal negligence was the mens rea for the offense of driving with a suspended
license); Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App 1985) (reading civil
negligence requirement into misdemeanor commercial fishing violations).
434. Cole, 828 P.2d at 179. The court reasoned that, unlike statutes governing
driving and commercial fishing, Alaska Statutes section 18.60.670 was not part of
a "comprehensive scheme of regulations dealing with participants in a licensed and
heavily regulated activity ... . Rather, the statute... establishe[d] a broad-based
criminal offense." Id
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In Willett v. State (Willett 1),435 the court of appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction for criminal mischief in the second degree
based upon damage the defendant intentionally caused to an
automobile.436 The amount of damages determines the degree of
the criminal mischief offense.437 The defendant contended the
amount of damages should have been measured by the decrease in
the fair market value of the car.438 The state's evidence and the
jury instructions, however, based the measure of damages on the
cost of repair.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that
Alaska Statutes section 11.46.980(a)' governed the determination
of damages in this case." The court ruled that the statute applies
only where a determination of property value is necessary, and
Alaska's criminal mischief statutes focus on the amount of damage
to the property, not the value of the property."2 Moreover, the
court held that the statute does not preclude the prosecution from
relying solely upon evidence of cost of repair to prove damages in
a criminal mischief case. 3 Only when a defendant argues that the
cost of repairs is unreasonable because it exceeds the value of the
damaged property does a determination of the pre-damage value
become necessary.44
435. 826 P.2d 1142 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (Willett 1).
436. Id. at 1143.
437. Alaska Statutes section 11.46.482(a) provides that criminal mischief in the
second degree occurs when a person intentionally damages the property of another
to the extent of $500 or more. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.492(a) (1989). Where
damage amounts to less than $500, the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.484, 11.46.486 (1989).
438. Willet I, 826 P.2d at 1144.
439. Id.
440. Alaska Statutes section 11.46.980(a) provides:
In this chapter, whenever it is necessary to determine the value of property,
that value is the market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime unless otherwise specified or, if the market value cannot be
reasonably ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.980(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
441. Willett I, 826 P.2d at 1145.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id at 1146. The court pointed out that if the prosecution had used
diminution in value to prove damages, a determination of the fair market value of
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The court of appeals subsequently declared in Willett v. State
(Willett HI)" that "[fleet, regardless of how they are shod, are not
per se dangerous instruments."' Rather, courts must determine
whether a foot constitutes a dangerous instrument on a case-by-case
basis, considering the manner in which the kick was rendered, the
victim's vulnerability to such a kick and the seriousness of the
resulting injury. 7
In State v. Waskey,"6 the court of appeals reinstated an
indictment of third-degree assault" 9 against the defendant after it
had been dismissed by the trial judge. 5 The intoxicated defen-
dant had driven through a stop sign and struck a bicyclist.45' Since
a car is not a traditional "deadly weapon," the trial court found that
the prosecutor should have given a special instruction to the grand
jury on the definition of "dangerous instrument.""4 2 The court of
appeals held, however, that assault with an automobile almost
always creates a substantial risk of death or injury, and that an
automobile does constitute a "dangerous instrument" under Alaska
Statutes section 11.41.220(a).5 3
the property would have been necessary. Id.
445. 836 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (Willett I1). The assault at issue in this
case was alleged to be in retaliation for the victim's testimony in Willett I.
446. Willett II, 836 P.2d at 959 (emphasis in original).
447. Id.
448. 834 P.2d 1251 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
449. Alaska Statutes section 11.41.220(a) states in relevant part:
(a) A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if that
person recklessly
(1) places another person in fear of imminent serious physical
injury by means of a dangerous instrument; or
(2) causes physical injury to another person by means of a
dangerous instrument.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220(a) (1989).
450. Waskey, 834 P.2d at 1252.
451. L
452. Id. The prosecutor read the grand jurors the statutory definition of
"dangerous instrument" as provided in Alaska Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(11):
"'dangerous instrument' means any deadly weapon or anything that, under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used,
is capable of causing death or serious physical injury." ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.-
900(b)(11) (1989).
453. Waskey, 834 P.2d at 1253-54.
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The court of appeals in Brackhan v. State 4 reversed the
defendant's conviction of theft in the fourth degree.4 55 The
defendant had fled a cab without paying the fare after the driver
assaulted him.4 6 Over the defendant's objection, the trial court
included in its instructions to the jury the language of Alaska
Statutes section 11.46.200(b), which provides that proof of "abscond-
ing" without payment for services constitutes a prima facie showing
of deception.!7 The defendant contended that this instruction
"created a presumption that impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof to the defense.""45
While it was within the trial court's discretion to inform the jury
of the presumption's existence,45 9 the trial court did so in a man-
ner that may have caused the jury to feel obliged to accept the
presumption.' The prima facie provision should have been cited
without further guidance to the jury.'
In Jurco v. State 2 the court of appeals held that a person is
not entitled to forcibly resist the taking of property by police
officers pursuant to a court order.' The defendant argued that
a federal bankruptcy court order directing him not to sell, transfer
or allow creditors to take his property preempted a state court's
forfeiture order and entitled him to defend his truck against
454. 839 P.2d 414 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
455. Md at 415. Alaska Statutes section 11.46.200(a)(1) provides:
(a) A person commits theft of services if
(1) the person obtains services, known by that person to be
available only for compensation, by deception, force, threat,
or other means to avoid payment for the services.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(1) (1989).
456. Brackhan, 839 P.2d at 415.
457. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.46.200(b) (1989).
458. Brackhan, 839 P.2d at 415.
459. The court examined Alaska Rule of Evidence 303(a)(1) and determined
that when a defendant offers evidence to rebut a presumption, the court has the
discretion to inform the jury of the presumption's existence. Brackhan, 839 P.2d
at 415-16. If, however, the court does inform the jury of the presumption, it must
do so in language that creates a permissible inference; the word "presumption"
cannot be used. Id. at 416.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 417.
462. 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
463. Id. at 910-11.
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unlawful seizure.' The court of appeals held that even if arguendo
Jurco "reasonably believed that the seizure of his truck was illegal,"
he should have submitted peaceably to the officer's order and
waited to contest the validity of the taking in court. 5  When
someone known to be (or reasonably appearing to be) a police
officer acts to execute a court order authorizing the seizure of
property, the property owner cannot use force to resist the sei-
zure. 
4M
In State v. Laraby,4 7 Laraby was charged with attempted
kidnapping and assault in the fourth degree.' His trial counsel
requested a lesser-included offense instruction with regard to the
attempted kidnapping charge, but then failed to object when the
trial court did not give the proposed instruction. 9  At a post-
conviction hearing, the trial court found that the defendant's trial
counsel had not acted competently and that this incompetence likely
contributed to Laraby's conviction.47
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals first
rejected the state's contention that Laraby had not effectively
eliminated all possibility that his attorney had a sound tactical
reason for failing to object." An action for post-conviction relief
is a civil proceeding and thus, the defendant only need prove his
attorney's omission was not tactical by a preponderance of the
evidence.4 There was sufficient evidence to support the lower
court's finding that the trial attorney's failure to object was more
likely than not attributable to error or neglect.473
Next, the state argued that such an error was not so "significant
to render counsel's performance constitutionally deficient., 474 The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that once the attorney had
recognized the propriety of requesting a lesser-included offense
464. Id. at 911.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 914.
467. 842 P.2d 1275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
468. Id. at 1276.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 1279.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1280.
474. Id.
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instruction, failure to object to the absence of the proposed
instruction was an error amounting to incompetence.475
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court decided several employ-
ment law cases falling in three categories: disability claims, violation
of employment contracts and damages. In the disability area, the
court examined the sufficiency of evidence necessary to make a
claim for temporary total disability benefits. On the contractual
front, the court addressed such issues as the claim of economic
duress in an involuntary separation agreement and the force of the
covenant of good faith implied in "at will" contracts. The damage
cases moved in a number of directions. For example, the court
issued an important opinion resulting in a lower standard for
enjoining the award of lump sums in workers' compensation cases.
A. Disability Claims
In Big K Grocery v. Gibson,476 the supreme court held that
testimony given by a qualified medical expert can be sufficient to
rebut the presumption of compensability.4' A doctor had testified
that Gibson's symptoms were probably caused by an operation prior
to the work-related accident, although he could not rule out the
possibility that the accident accelerated the preexisting condition.
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that the decision
of the Alaska Worker's Compensation Board (Board) was support-
ed by substantial evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of
compens-ability.478
In Baker v. Reed-Dowd Co.,479 the supreme court examined
the sufficiency of evidence supporting a claim of continued tempo-
rary total impairment resulting from a shoulder injury. The Board
awarded temporary total disability benefits to cover the period
475. Id.
476. 836 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1992).
477. Id. at 942-43 (citations omitted) (discussing Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d
865, (Alaska 1985); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska
1976)).
478. Id. at 942 & n.1, 943.
479. 836 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1992).
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extending from the time a doctor declared Baker ready to return to
work through one year after another doctor performed, surgery on
the same type of injury in the same shoulder.'
The supreme court held that the medical testimony comprised
sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding of a connection
between the subsequent rotator cuff injury and the initial work-rela-
ted injury."' The supreme court also ruled in favor of Baker on
the issue of temporary total disability benefits for recovery time,
disagreeing with the Board's conclusion that Baker was no longer
physically impaired at the time his benefits were discontinued.'
The court determined that Reed-Dowd had not met the burden of
supplying substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of
continuing disability.' Although doctors testified as to Baker's
medical stability, they were unable to predict his physical capacity
for work. Neither the doctors' depositions nor the Board's
determination that Baker's testimony was not credible were
sufficient to overcome the presumption of continuing disability.'
In Leslie Cutting, Inc. v. Bateman, the supreme court held
that the statute of limitations on a temporary total disability claim
for a long-term condition begins to run only when one can no longer
reasonably believe that the condition will respond to further
treatment.4 Bateman, a logger with a debilitating allergy to a
common forest lichen, had continued working intermittently for
years with the assistance of dangerous medications." Eventually,
480. Id. at 918.
481. Id. at 920.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 919 (citing Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669, 672 (Alaska
1991)).
484. Id. at 920. The court noted that the Board apparently confused the term
"medical stability," which means that the patient is as healthy as he will ever be,
with complete recovery from disability. Id. at 920 n.10. This distinction was
important, because Baker's injury preceded an amendment to the statute governing
temporary total disability benefits. In 1988, the legislature announced, "Temporary
total disability benefits may not be paid for any period of disability occurring after
the date of medical stability," but this applies only to injuries sustained after July
1,1988. Id. at 919 n.5 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.185 (1990) (amended 1988)).
485. Id. at 920.
486. 833 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1992).
487. Id. at 694.
488. Id. at 691-92.
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in 1989, Bateman's doctor recommended that he be placed on
disability and receive vocational rehabilitation. 4 9 Responding to
Bateman's claim before the Board, the employer's insurance carrier
argued that the statute of limitations barred the claim because
Bateman knew of his disability since 1984.
The supreme court noted that the Alaska Workers' Compensa-
tion Act provides disabled workers two years from when they
realize "'the nature of [their] disability and its relation to [their]
employment' to file a claim.,, 490 Bateman had known for years
that his injury could be avoided by not working in the woods, but
he believed it could be safely controlled by medication. The
supreme court had previously held that the examination of disability
centers on the loss of earning capacity, not on actual medical impair-
ment4 9' Thus, the court reasoned "that one does not know the
nature of one's disability and the relationship of the disability to
one's employment until one knows of the disability's full effect on
one's earning capacity. The mere awareness of the disability's full
physical effect is not sufficient."4  The supreme court affirmed
the lower court's ruling that the statute of limitations did not start
to run until the "point that [Baker] was first fully aware of the
nature of his disability and the allergy's bearing on his employ-
ment," after which he could not reasonably believe that he could
still earn his customary wages."
B. Violation of Employment Contracts
In Bobich v. Stewart,494 the trial court ordered Dimond Mini-
Storage and its general partner, Matthew Bobich, to pay overtime
wages to two employees495 Bobich appealed the lower court's
decision, challenging the existence of a jury issue as to the number
of people employed by Dimond.4 96 Bobich claimed that Dimond
489. Id. at 692-93.
490. Id. at 694 (alteration in original) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.105(a)
(1990)).
491. Id. (citing Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103, 105 (Alaska 1990)).
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. 843 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1992).
495. Id. at 1233.
496. Id at 1235.
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had only three employees (the Stewarts and one part-time employ-
ee), and was therefore exempted from the overtime pay provisions
of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA).4" The supreme
court upheld the trial court's refusal of a directed verdict because
reasonable jurors could differ as to whether Bobich and an
independent bookkeeper constituted employees or independent
contractors under the standard of Jeffcoat v. State Department of
Labor.498
Bobich also claimed that as a partner in Dimond Mini-Storage,
he could not be counted as an employee, and therefore the lower
court erred in instructing the jury to consider as employees "all
officers of a corporation who actively engage in the business."'499
The supreme court reasoned that when a partner receives regular
compensation regardless of profits,
he looks less like a shareholder and more like a salaried
corporate officer. Therefore, for the purposes of [Alaska
Statutes section] 23.10.060(1), [the court] shall consider such a
compensated partner to be both an owner and an employee. To
do otherwise would permit employers to defeat the AWHA's
remedial purposes by simply calling paid employees 'part-
ners.'
500
In Zeilinger v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co.,5 ' an employee
appealed from a directed verdict that upheld an involuntary
separation agreement. Among other grounds, Zeilinger argued that
the agreement should be rescinded because she signed it while
under economic duress.502
The supreme court looked to its previously articulated standard
of duress, requiring that "'(1) one party involuntarily accepted the
terms of another, (2) circumstances permitted no other alternative,
and (3) such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the
other party.""'5 3 The court noted that the third prong requires a
497. Id. at 1234 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(1) (1984)).
498. Id. at 1235 (citing Jeffcoat v. State Dept. of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1075-76
(1987)).
499. Id at 1236 & n.6 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 15.140 (April
1991)).
500. Id at 1236.
501. 823 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1992).
502. Id at 657.
503. Id. (quoting Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.,
584 P.2d 15, 21 (Alaska 1978)).
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coercive act and a causal link between that act and the economic
duress.5 °4 The court held that even assuming that the employee's
discharge was not pursuant to a valid reduction in force, SOHIO
took no action constituting threats or coercion. 5 SOHIO had not
placed the employee in her already troubled financial circumstances,
and her "economic necessity - very often the prime motivation for
compromise - is not enough, by itself, to void an otherwise valid
release."5'
Chief Justice Rabinowitz dissented with respect to the court's
analysis of the third prong of the test for economic duress. He
found the record to contain evidence supporting the claim that
SOHIO, aware of its employee's financial straits, wrongfully chose
to add her to the reduction in force rather than terminate her under
the lengthy standard discipline policy."c7 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that a directed verdict was inappropriate because a reason-
able jury could find that SOIO's threat of "imminent deprivation
of her income, which would arguably have an immediate and
catastrophic effect on her financial situation, played a direct causal
role in her decision to agree to and execute the separation agree-
ment.,
508
In University of Alaska v. Tovsen, °9 a university employee on
probationary status was terminated, despite the finding of the
University Grievance Council that Tovsen's superior had been
negligent in training and evaluating her. The Grievance Council
believed that a university regulation gave Tovsen's superior "the
discretion to terminate Tovsen without just cause based on his
subjective dissatisfaction with her performance., 51 The superior
court ruled that the regulation does not give a supervisor the right
to terminate on subjective dissatisfaction and ordered reinstatement
with back pay. 1'
504. Id. at 658.
505. Id.
506. Id. (citing Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753-54 (Utah
1982)).
507. Id at 659 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
508. Id. at 660 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
509. 835 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1992).
510. Id. at 446.
511. Id.
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The supreme court affirmed the superior court's interpretation
of the regulation, but reversed the reinstatement and back pay
order, pending a remand to the Chancellor to examine the case for
just cause for dismissal.512 The court concluded that University
Regulation 04.01.06(B), which states "[i]f the employee's perfor-
mance is found to be unsatisfactory, the employee will be terminat-
ed," is not a typical satisfaction clause in that the language of the
regulation requires an objective failure to meet acceptable stan-
dards.513 The court held that because "the Grievance Council
found that Tovsen's termination was not supported by just cause...
its recommendation that Tovsen not be reinstated was wrong as a
matter of law."514
In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Luedtke 11),5"5 the
Alaska Supreme Court returned to the same fact scenario raised in
Luedtke 1,516 where an employee, Luedtke, was terminated after
he tested positive for marijuana use in a urinalysis. Whereas
Luedtke I dealt with the plaintiff's termination for refusing to submit
to a drug test, the court here examined whether Luedtke's suspen-
sion for testing positive prior to his termination violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in "at will" con-
tracts.5 17  No other employee was similarly tested, and Nabors
immediately suspended Luedtke upon learning the results of the
test.5'8 The supreme court held that as a matter of law the
employer's actions constituted a violation of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.519 Among the factors that the court
considered significant were the lack of notice prior to testing and
the failure to test other employees.
512. Id. at 448.
513. Id. at 447.
514. Id.
515. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
516. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
517. Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1222.
518. IM. at 1225-26.
519. Id at 1226.
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C. Damages
In Forest v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,' 2° the supreme court held
that an employee who sues a third party for the aggravation of an
existing work-related injury does not forfeit the right to all compen-
sation from the employer, although the employer has been excluded
from settlement negotiations.5 21 Forest underwent surgery that
aggravated a work-related injury. Safeway, his employer, notified
him that it intended to share in the proceeds of his subsequent
malpractice action pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015,
which allows the collection of damages from third-party
tortfeasors5" When Forest agreed to dismiss his malpractice
action with prejudice, Safeway petitioned the Workers' Compensa-
tion Board, claiming that in dismissing the suit against the third
party without Safeway's permission, Forest had waived his claim to
all further workers' compensation benefits from Safeway. The
Board agreed and on appeal, the superior court affirmed.5"3
The supreme court held that "Safeway had a legitimate, albeit
dependent, interest in Forest's third-party claim" against the
doctor.524 However, reading the statute in light of previous pro-
employee interpretations, the court held that an employer should
not receive the windfall of avoiding all payment merely because an
employee's lawyer "blunder[ed]" in pursuing a third-party suit. 5
The court remanded for a determination as to what share of the
injury was attributable to the third party's negligence. Forest was
assigned the burden of proof in distinguishing his initial injury from
any further injury caused by the doctor's negligencei' 6
Justice Matthews, joined by Chief Justice Rabinowitz, dissented
with respect to the portion of the majority's holding that discussed
how an employee may avoid forfeiture. 27 Justice Matthews
accepted the majority view that the employee could avoid forfeiture
by showing that the aggravation of the initial work-related injury
520. 830 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1992).
521. Id. at 782.
522. Id. at 779.
523. Id at 780 (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.015(h) (1990)).
524. Id. at 782.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 783 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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was negligible, but reasoned that when an employee dismisses a suit
against a third-party joint tortfeasor without the employer's
permission, the employee should not be able to avoid forfeiture of
his claim by establishing that the third party was not negligent.521
In Alcan Electric v. Bringmann,529 the supreme court held that
Bringmann, a worker with an ankle injury covered under workers'
compensation, could recoup transportation costs incurred in
obtaining medical treatment in California.53 An Alaskan doctor
told Bringmann that he would consider performing an operation
that would reduce Bringmann's pain, but that the operation would
eliminate most of the motion in his ankle.53' Bringmann then
consulted a doctor in California, who operated on Bringmann's
ankle with an "extremely complicated" combination of six proce-
dures, each of which the Alaskan doctor testified he could perform
individually. 32 The Board agreed with Alcan's claim that Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.265(20) did not cover transportation to
California, since adequate facilities were available in Alaska.533
The supreme court affirmed the superior court's reversal of the
Board's decision. First, the supreme court held that the Board erred
by overlooking "the presumption of compensability [that] applies to
continuing medical care."''  Second, the court held that Alcan
introduced no evidence to show that any doctor working in Alaska
had suggested performing this complex combination of procedures,
even though the procedures could be performed individually. The
court reasoned that when a doctor fails to recommend an option to
a patient, the option should be considered unavailable to that
patient. The court thus held that Bringmann's evidence coupled
with the unrebutted presumption of compensability "satisfied his
528. Id. at 783 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
529. 829 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1992).
530. Id. at 1190.
531. Id. at 1188.
532. Id.
533. I& at 1189. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.265(20) provides in pertinent part
that "medical and related benefits' includes ...transportation charges to the
nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available." ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.30.265(20) (Supp. 1992)).
534. Alcan Electric, 829 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Olsen v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818
P.2d 669, 675 (Alaska 1991)).
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burden of proof that adequate medical treatment was unavailable in
Alaska.""53
In Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson,536 the supreme court held
that in assessing requests for a stay of enforcement of a lump sum
award in workers' compensation cases, the lesser "serious and
substantial questions" standard should be used rather than the more
strict "probability of success on the merits" standard. 37 In Wise
Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell,53 s the supreme court had previ-
ously announced the "irreparable damage" two-prong test which
must be satisfied in order to obtain a stay of a workers' compensa-
tion award on appeal 39 The test requires that the party seeking
the stay demonstrate both the financial irresponsibility of the
claimant and the probability that the claimant will lose on the merits
on appealY'4 The Bignell court justified this rule by balancing the
hardships of the parties. Under the probability of success on the
merits standard alone, the employee would almost always be
inadequately protected 41 Thus, the Bignell court required the
party seeking the stay to satisfy both prongs of the irreparable
damage test.
The Olsen court clarified the Bignell test, reasoning that "[i]n
most cases involving lump sum awards the balance is different. The
employee can be adequately protected and the employer generally
stands to suffer the greater hardship." 2 The court reasoned that
an employee is usually not dependent on lump sum awards for daily
expenses, but that under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(), an
employer who makes an overpayment to an employee can only
recoup that money by holding back up to twenty percent of future
compensation out of installment payments. 3 Arguing by analogy
to an earlier case concerning preliminary injunctions, A.J. Industries,
535. Id. at 1190.
536. 832 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1992).
537. Id. at 176.
538. 626 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1981).
539. Id. at 1087, quoted in Olsen Logging, 832 P.2d at 175.
540. Id., cited in Olsen Logging, 832 P.2d at 175.
541. Olsen Logging, 832 P.2d at 176 ("[T]he hope of a future award is a meager
substitute for life's daily necessities.") (citing Bignell, 626 P.2d at 1087).
542. Id.
543. Id. (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.1550) (1990)).
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Ina v. Alaska Public Service Commission,' the supreme court
recalled that the "balance of hardships" approach means that "'if
[the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the plaintiff], it will
ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to
the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make
them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative
investigation."' 5  Since Olsen bore the greater hardship and had
raised "serious and substantial" questions about the merits, Olsen's
stay of the lump sum award on appeal was improperly denied.5"
In Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.,547 the supreme court
affirmed the granting of summary judgment against Bozarth, for
although he claimed he was dismissed for raising safety complaints
and not for his refusal to submit to drug testing, Bozarth produced
no evidence to rebut his employer's assertion. " The court also
affirmed the lower court's decision to award Atlantic-Richfield fifty
percent of its attorney's fees as permissible partial compensation
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82."
Justice Matthews, joined by Justice Compton, dissented in part
with regard to the award of attorney's fees. Justice Matthews
indicated that the $76,000 sum awarded by the court would
represent a crushing financial blow to almost any individual citizen,
such that the chilling effect could cause a limitation of access to the
courts and a denial of due process.550 He suggested instead that
"in wrongful discharge claims the award of attorney's fees [should]
not exceed some fraction of the former employee's annual in-
come."
551
544. 470 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1970), modified, 483 P.2d 198 (1971).
545. Olsen Logging, 832 P.2d at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting A.J.
Industries, 470 P.2d. at 541; Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d
738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953)).
546. Id. at 174.
547. 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992).
548. Id. at 3-4.
549. Id. at 4.
550. Id. at 5-6 (Matthews, J. dissenting).
551. Id. at 6 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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VII. FAMILY LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court decided many cases in the
area of family law, the majority of which concerned issues of
custody, child support and property division. In particular, the
supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 90.3 and affirmed its application in several child support
cases. The court also had the opportunity to consider the effect of
the United Services Former Spouses' Protection Act on marital
property division.
A. Custody and Child Support
In Harvick v. Harvick,52 the supreme court held that when a
custodial parent withdraws her voluntary relinquishment of parental
rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) ,55 custody
does not automatically revert back to that parent.554  Clyde
Harvick appealed a superior court decision which allowed his ex-
wife, Dorthea Harvick, to withdraw her relinquishment of parental
rights in their daughter. The decision reinstated a 1979 court order
awarding custody to Mrs. Harvick.55
Under a literal application of ICWA Section 1913(c), Mrs.
Harvick was entitled to have the relinquishment document set
aside556 However, the relinquishment document constituted a
modification of custody and, therefore, Mrs. Harvick was not
automatically entitled to regain custody of the child5 7 The court
reasoned a divorce decree awarding custody is effective only as
between the two parties.558 Thus, when one parent dies, custody
necessarily transfers to the non-custodial parent. The court found
552. 828 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1992).
553. Section 1913(c) of the Indian Child Welfare Act provides:
In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or
adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be
withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree
of termination or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be
returned to the parent.
25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1978).
554. Harvick, 828 P.2d at 772.
555. I& at 770.
556. Id. at 771.
557. Id. at 772.
558. Id. at 771.
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the relinquishment document effected a similar transfer of custody
in this case.559 Concluding Mr. Harvick was the custodial parent,
the court remanded, holding that Mrs. Harvick had the burden of
showing substantial reasons for a further modification of custo-
dy.560
In Coghill v. Coghill,6' the supreme court upheld the consti-
tutionality of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3, which provides
a formula for calculating a non-custodial parent's child support
obligation. 62 The appellant argued adoption of the rule by the
supreme court effected a substantive change in the law by modifying
Alaska Statutes section 25.24.160, which authorizes courts to
determine support obligations "'as may be just and proper for the
parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their
children."'' s  The supreme court held Civil Rule 90.3 does not
amend Alaska Statutes section 25.24.160, but rather "interprets the
statute and establishes guidelines to enable courts to determine what
is a 'just and proper' contribution.""
The appellant next argued that the rule creates an irrebuttable
presumption, denying the non-custodial parent due process. 65 The
supreme court noted that other courts "have found that child
support guidelines do not offend due process so long as they provide
for discretion in their application.''51 Civil Rule 90.3 recognizes
the potential need to deviate from the formula and authorizes such
a departure in certain circumstances. 67
Finally, appellant argued that because the income of the
custodial parent is not considered in the Rule 90.3 formula, the rule
violates standards of equal protection.s6 The supreme court
noted, however, that "'equal protection has never required that
differently situated persons be treated the same way.' '5 69  For
559. Id. at 771-72.
560. Id. at 772.
561. 836 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1992).
562. Id. at 927.
563. Id (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1992)).
564. Id. (citing ALASKA R. CIv. PRO. 90.3, commentary I(B)).
565. Id.
566. Id. at 929.
567. Id. at 928.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 929.
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purposes of child support, the court concluded that custodial and
noncustodial parents are not similarly situated."' 0 Because this
distinction between custodial and noncustodial parents is of an
economic nature, standard equal protection analysis requires only a
fair and substantial relationship between the discrimination and the
purpose of the rule. 71 In conclusion, the court stated that the
percentage of income approach delineated in the rule is fairly and
substantially related to the goals of Rule 90.3.572
In Epperson v. Epperson,73 the husband contended that past
voluntary financial contributions to his daughter in excess of his
support obligation constituted good cause to deviate from the Rule
90.3 formula, and should be credited against his future support
obligation. 4 The supreme court allowed such contributions to be
offset against past due child support,75 but held it to be "contrary
to the purpose of Civil Rule 90.3 to offset such contributions against
future child support payments except in exceptional circumstanc-
es."
576
In Zimin v. Zimin,s" the husband challenged the inclusion of
money deposited in a Capital Construction Fund 78 in the calcula-
tion of his 1990 income for determining his child support obliga-
tion. 79 Although the IRS allows certain amounts to be deducted
from income, the commentary to Civil Rule 90.3 provides that these
amounts should not be deducted from income for purposes of
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 930.
573. 835 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1992).
574. Id. at 453.
575. Id.; see Arnt v. Arnt, 777 P.2d 668, 671 (Alaska 1989); Young v. Williams,
583 P.2d 201, 203 (Alaska 1978).
576. Epperson, 835 P.2d at 453 (emphasis added). The court implied a different
result had there been evidence of an agreement between the parents that these
contributions were to be considered prepayment for future support. Id.
577. 837 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1992).
578. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 allows a taxpayer who owns an eligible
vessel to establish a Capital Construction Fund to support the construction or
reconstruction of American vessels. See 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1989). Taxable income
is then reduced by certain amounts deposited in the fund for that tax year. See 26
U.S.C. § 7518 (c)(1)(A) (1989).
579. Zimin, 837 P.2d at 120 n.2.
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calculating child support. 8 As the goal of the Rule 90.3 guide-
lines is to gain a realistic estimate of the non-custodial parent's
annual income, the court concluded that the funds secured in the
Capital Construction Fund should rightfully be included in Mr.
Zimin's 1990 income when calculating child support.181
In Bock v. Bock,5" the supreme court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear an interstate child custody case. In light of
the policy "against simultaneous proceedings in separate states, and
the importance of avoiding conflicting custody orders," the court
found that Alaska improperly continued to exercise jurisdiction
following clear indications that Kentucky would not relinquish its
jurisdiction." Moreover, the court reasoned that the absence of
a formal act of deferral by the Kentucky court solidified Kentucky's
claim of continuing jurisdiction.5" Since Kentucky law also
determined whether Kentucky retained jurisdiction to determine
future questions of custody, despite the fact that the mother and
children resided in Alaska for the preceding four years,58 the
court held that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act"
precluded Alaska from asserting jurisdiction over the matter so long
as Kentucky claimed a "'significant connection"' to the case under
its own child custody act."'
In Pinneo v. Pinneo,5 88 the supreme court held that Alaska
had jurisdiction to modify a custody decree although the children
had lived outside the state for several years. The trial court asserted
jurisdiction to determine custody under Alaska Statutes section
25.30.020(a)(3), finding that no other state would meet the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites. 89 Mrs. Pinneo contended that the trial court
580. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3, commentary III(B).
581. Zimin, 837 P.2d at 122.
582. 824 P.2d 723 (Alaska 1992).
583. Id. at 724.
584. Id.
585. Id
586. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1990).
587. Bock, 824 P.2d at 724 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(1990)).
588. 835 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1992).
589. Id. at 1236. The children had moved with their mother from Alaska to
Washington to Texas to California and back to Texas. Id. at 1234. Although
Alaska was not the home state of the children at the onset of the proceeding, the
court found that on the evidence presented neither California nor Texas could
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should have undertaken an independent examination to determine
if any other state could exercise jurisdiction over the matter 9°
The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the "party to a custody
dispute [who] believes that another state has jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with AS 25.30.020(a)(1) or
(2) ... bears the burden of presenting the court with evidence which
. . . would support a finding that the other state has jurisdic-
tion. ,5 91
Mrs. Pinneo also challenged the grant of custody to the father,
arguing that no significant change in circumstances occurred to
warrant the modification 92 Again the supreme court disagreed,
finding a series of relocations from state to state constituted a
substantial change in circumstances.'
In the divorce proceeding of Deininger v. Deininger, 4 the
supreme court addressed a unique custody arrangement ordered by
the trial court. Although the parties were granted joint legal
custody of the children, the wife was to have primary physical
custody for the first two years. Then, the parents were to share
physical custody on an alternating weekly basis.59 The supreme
court affirmed the arrangement, reasoning that trial courts have
broad discretion "to fashion custody awards designed to meet the
unique needs of the individuals involved."' 96  The court also
concluded that the arrangement did not effect an automatic
modification of custody, but rather allowed the court order of
shared physical custody to be slowly implemented over a two-year
period.597
assert jurisdiction in accordance with Alaska's jurisdictional conditions. Id. at 1236;
see ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020(a)(l)-(2) (1992).
590. Pinneo, 835 P.2d at 1236.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 1238. Alaska Statutes section 25.20.110 authorizes the modification
of a custody award only where there has been a change in circumstances and the
modification would be in the best interests of the child. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.110
(1992).
593. Pinneo, at 1238.
594. 835 P.2d 449 (Alaska 1992).
595. Id. at 450.
596. Id. at 451.
597. Id.
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B. Property Division
In Johnson v. Johnson,59 the supreme court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to an equitable share of her husband's
military retirement pension.599 Under the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA),6 military retirement
benefits may be subject to marital property division, depending
upon state law. Alaska law provides that military benefits may be
equitably divided between divorcing spouses."°1 The USFSPA was
amended in 1990, providing divorce decrees entered prior to June
25, 1981 could not be reopened in order to divide military retire-
ment benefits. Since the divorce decree was entered in 1977, the
supreme court found that the 1990 amendment precluded any rights
the wife might have had to the benefits under Alaska law.'
The supreme court was called upon again to interpret the
USFSPA in Clauson v. Clauson.'3  In the divorce proceedings,
Mrs. Clauson had been awarded an equitable share of her husband's
military retirement pension. When her husband later elected to
waive his retirement benefits in order to collect veterans disability
benefits, Mrs. Clauson filed for and obtained a modification of the
final divorce decree, requiring her former husband to pay her an
amount equivalent to her share of the waived retirement pension.
Her husband challenged this award, arguing it contravened the
United States Supreme Court holding in Mansell v. Mansell,'
which "precludes state courts from considering a former spouse's
military disability benefits received in lieu of waived retirement pay
when making an equitable division of marital assets." 5
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that under Mansell, the
USFSPA clearly prohibited the redistribution effected by the
598. 824 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1992).
599. Id. at 1382.
600. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1990).
601. Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1983).
602. The supreme court found that although the 1990 amendment was enacted
only while this appeal was pending, the retroactive intent of Congress was clear and
thus the court was to apply the amended version of the USFSPA. Johnson, 834
P.2d at 1383.
603. 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992).
604. 490 U.S. 581 (1988).
605. Clauson, 831 P.2d at 1262.
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Clauson modification order,' since the effect of the trial court's
award was to give Mrs. Clauson a share of her husband's disability
benefits. The supreme court also held, however, that Alaska courts
were not precluded by federal law from considering the economic
consequences of veteran's disability pay when equitably allocating
marital property upon divorce.6
In Chotiner v. Chotiner," the husband challenged the court's
classification of a $100,000 annuity as marital property subject to
division. The funds used to purchase the annuity consisted of the
husband's military severance pay and inheritance money. The
supreme court concluded that the inheritance and military severance
pay should have been considered separate property, unless the
husband conveyed those assets to the marital estate. If those funds
were marital assets when the annuity was purchased, the annuity
was marital property at the time of divorce.' As the trial court
made no findings as to whether the husband intended to transfer his
separate assets to the marital estate, the supreme court remanded
the case for further consideration.' Finally, the supreme court
concluded that neither (1) joint investments made by the parties
resulting in significant losses, nor (2) the wife's status as the primary
wage earner justified invading the annuity to effect an equitable
distribution. 1
VIII. FISH AND GAME LAW
In 1992, several cases were decided in the area of fish and game
law. One strengthened the state's power to restrict or prohibit
particular methods of hunting and fishing (that is, the use of aircraft
to spot fish), while another addressed Alaska's complex statutory
scheme governing subsistence hunting. The remaining two cases
clarified various administrative provisions governing fishing.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 1264. The supreme court warned, however, against merely shifting
"an amount of property equivalent to the waived retirement pay from the military
spouse's side of the ledger to the other spouse's side." Id.
608. 829 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1992).
609. Id. at 833.
610. Id.
611. Id
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In Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v. State Department of Fish &
Game, 12 the supreme court upheld a regulation prohibiting the
use of aircraft to locate salmon in Bristol Bay during open commer-
cial salmon fishing periods.61 The supreme court held, however,
that Article VIII, Section 2 of the Alaska Constitution gave the
Board authority to ban aerial fish spotting for the purpose of
conserving the natural resources of the state.1 4
The Fish Spotters claimed that the regulation "eliminated their
'historical' and 'long enjoyed' access to the fish resource," thus
violating the common use clause of the Alaska Constitution.611
The court, however, reasoned that the common use clause does not
obligate the state "to guarantee access to a natural resource by a
person's preferred means or method. ' 61 6 Neither did the court
find Fish Spotters to be a unique 'user group,' defined by their
preferred means of accessing the resource.61 Under past 'common
use' clause analysis, the court consistently defined 'user groups' in
terms of the nature of the resource and the nature of the use and
the court explicitly refused to alter such analysis. 6 8  The court
noted the prohibition did not preclude all uses of the resource by
those people, and it was a permissible limitation on the means and
methods of fishing.6 9
The Fish Spotters' second constitutional claim alleged the
regulation violated the "no exclusive rights" clause of the Alaska
Constitution,6' because it sheltered non-spotter-aided fishermen
from competition.621 The court rejected this claim, for although
in the past the court had struck down regulatory schemes granting
special monopolistic privileges, the banning of aerial spotting did not
612. 838 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1992).
613. Id. at 799.
614. Id. at 800-01; see ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
615. Alaska Fish Spotters, 838 P.2d at 801; see ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 3
("Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved
to the people for common use.").
616. Alaska Fish Spotters, 838 P.2d at 801.
617. Id.
618. IM. at 803.
619. Id.
620. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15 ("No exclusive right or special privilege of
fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State.").
621. Alaska Fish Spotters, 838 P.2d at 803.
[Vol. 10:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
create "an exclusive right or a special privilege," nor did it exclude
the Fish Spotters from many other uses of the fishing resource.62
Finally, the court quickly rejected the Fish Spotters' other constitu-
tional claims of violations of the "equal protection"6' and "uni-
form application"'624 clauses of the constitution, because the
regulation applied equally to all citizens.6'
In State v. Morry,6' the supreme court construed a variety of
statutes and regulations affecting subsistence hunting in Alaska.
The case arose when a subsistence hunter was charged with shooting
a brown bear without complying with two provisions of the Alaska
Administrative Code. Specifically, the hunter was charged with
violating section 92.012(c) of title 5 of the Code, which required the
hunter to tag his bear.6' In addition, the hunter failed to keep the
skin and skull of the bear and have a state official stamp those parts
with a seal as required by section 92.165 of title 5.6' The supreme
court addressed the validity of these regulations under the state's
subsistence preference law.62
9
Four distinct issues were raised by the case. First, the court
addressed the validity of the regulations. The court found persua-
sive the plaintiffs' argument that application of the regulations,
which were designed to govern trophy hunting, would be "manifestly
unreasonable" in the subsistence use context.60 The court also
examined the proper standard of review for assessing the validity of
regulations covering subsistence uses. The supreme court noted that
622. Id
623. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
624. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 17 ("Laws and regulations governing the use
or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated
with reference to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or
regulation.").
625. Alaska Fish Spotters, 838 P.2d at 803-04.
626. 836 P.2d 358 (Alaska 1992).
627. Id. at 360; see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.012(c) (Oct. 1991).
628. Morry, 836 P.2d at 360; see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.165 (Supp.
Jan. 1993).
629. Morry, 836 P.2d at 360.
630. Id. at 363-64. The court also found that the required administrative
hearings regarding adoption of the challenged regulations had never been held. Id.
at 364; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.010-.650 (1989 & Supp. 1992); ALASKA STAT.
§ 16.05.255(a) (1992) ("Board of Game may adopt regulations it considers advisable
in accordance with AS 44.62 [Administrative Procedure Act]").
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Alaska's subsistence laws did not explicitly mention the "least
intrusive" standard, nor could the standard be implied from the
"reasonable opportunity" the law affords subsistence users to
harvest the resource631
The court next concluded that "all Alaskans are... eligible to
participate in first tier subsistence harvests and uses." 2  Finally,
the court reversed the superior court's holding that the boards of
fish and game must protect the customary and traditional patterns
and methods of subsistence hunting and fishing under Alaska's
subsistence preference laws. 3  Thus, the court invalidated the
administrative regulations as subsistence regulations, and remanded
to the board for promulgation of appropriate regulations.'
Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Russo635
involved Alaska's regulatory point system governing issuance of
entry permits.1 6  Specifically, the supreme court examined the
"unavoidable circumstances" provision governing the award of "past
participation points."637 The case arose when the Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) determined that Russo was
entitled to thirteen participation points under the regulatory scheme,
thus falling short of the seventeen required to receive a permit.638
While the court recognized that Russo, as a non-licensee partner,
631. Id. at 365; see ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(b)(1)(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT.
§ 16.05258(f) (1992).
632. Id. at 368 (citing Madison v. Alaska Dep't of Fish and Game, 696 P.2d 168,
174 (Alaska 1985) (Board of Game lacks authority to adopt eligibility criteria for
first tier subsistence users absent statutory authority); McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d
1,9 (Alaska 1990) (statute authorizing distinction between urban and rural residents
at first tier violates Alaska Constitution)).
633. Id. at 370.
634. Id. at 370-71.
635. 833 P.2d 7 (Alaska 1992).
636. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, §§ 05.600-.751 (Oct. 1988 & Supp. Jan.
1993).
637. Russo, 833 P.2d at 7. Under section 05.630(a)(4), a fisherman who is not
a gear license holder may earn only eight past participation points unless he is
entitled to unavoidable circumstance points under part (a)(5). Part (a)(5) provides
"if unavoidable circumstances exist such that an applicant's past participation...
is not realistically reflected by points awarded .... the commission may award an
applicant up to a maximum of 16 points upon a special showing of past participa-
tion." ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 05.630(a)(4)-(5) (Oct. 1988).
638. Russo, 833 P.2d at 7.
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may have been in a unique situation, this status had not been
brought about by unavoidable external forces. Thus, the court
concluded that the CFEC's refusal to find unavoidable circumstanc-
es was proper.09
In Haggren v. State,' the Alaska Court of Appeals clarified
a strict liability regulation prohibiting the operation of a commercial
drift gill net within 600 feet of a set gill net."' Haggren was
fishing with a drift gill net when another fisherman placed a set gill
net in the water nearby. The nets eventually became tangled.' 2
Haggren was subsequently tried and convicted for the strict liability
violation of operating his drift net within 600 feet of the set gill
net.643
Haggren argued he had priority because his net was in the
water first. Under his suggested "first in time, first in right" rule,
the other fisherman was obliged to deploy the set gill net more than
600 feet from Haggren's drift net.' The court rejected this
argument, holding the regulation was intended to restrict the drift
net fisherman regardless of the order of arrival of the nets.s
IX. NATIVE LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court decided three cases
concerning the sovereignty of native tribal governments. The court's
interpretation of both contracts and statutes served to limit tribal
sovereignty. Chief Justice Rabinowitz dissented alone in each of the
three cases, arguing in favor of preserving sovereign immunity.
In Hydaburg Coop. Assoc. v. Hydaburg Fisheries,' Hydaburg
Cooperative Association (HCA), a Native American corporation,
entered into a joint venture agreement with Hydaburg Fisheries to
operate a fish processing plant. When the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce Economic Development Administration failed
to approve the project, the parties submitted certain disputes to
639. Id. at 10.
640. 829 P.2d 842 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
641. Id. at 842-43; see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 21.335(a) (Oct. 1991)).
642. Haggren, 829 P.2d at 843.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id
646. 826 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1992).
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arbitration, in accordance with their agreement, to be settled under
the Uniform Arbitration Act of the State of Alaska.57 After
losing in arbitration over certain expenditures claimed by Hydaburg
Fisheries, HCA did not appeal the award of damages. Rather,
HCA appealed the superior court's order directing the application
of HCA's property to the judgment against it.' HCA argued
that it retained sovereign immunity and further, that section 16 of
the Indian Reorganization Act protected its assets from execu-
tion.649
The supreme court first held that HCA is merely an Alaska
Native association and, without proof of tribal status recognition
from the federal government, could not claim sovereign immuni-
ty."° Second, even assuming HCA's historical tribal status might
entitle it to sovereign immunity, the court determined that HCA
had waived immunity by agreeing to arbitration."' The arbitra-
tion clause would be rendered meaningless if HCA had not intended
to waive its immunity to arbitration.'
As to HCA's second claim, the court held that federal law
could not operate to prevent the enforcement of the judgment
against HCA's assets because HCA does not fall under the
protection of section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act.653 In
the absence of any proof supporting section 16 status, the supreme
court held that HCA must therefore be presumed to be a non-
647. Id. at 752. Because HCA had received a public grant to develop the
processing plant, the project was contingent on the approval of the Economic
Development Administration. Id.
648. Id.
649. Id. (citing Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988)).
650. Id. at 753-54 (citing Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management &
Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1988)).
651. Id. at 754.
652. Id at 755.
653. Id. at 756. The Indian Reorganization Act reads in pertinent part:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such
tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers:.., to prevent
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interest in
lands, or other tribal assets without consent of the tribe.
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
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exempt section 17 organization subject to judgment against its
property.'
Although Chief Justice Rabinowitz agreed that HCA did waive
its rights, 5 he dissented on the issue of whether HCA could claim
protection under section 16: "That the HCA was involved in a
commercial agreement does not overcome the presumption that its
assets are exempt from execution unless specifically conveyed or set
aside to the [section] 17 corporation. '656
In Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie,657 Nenana
Fuel Company attempted to collect on a promissory note signed by
the Venetie Tribal Government and the Native Village of
Venetie.68 The security agreement contained a "Remedies on
Default" clause which allowed Nenana to bring suit upon the
promissory note and pursue additional remedies upon default.659
The court construed the "Remedies on Default" clause as expressly
waiving any sovereign immunity to which either the Tribal Govern-
ment or the Village Corporation may have been entitled.'
Reversing the superior court, the supreme court further held that
the agreement's terms, which clearly permitted suits in Alaska
courts, did not require Nenana to exhaust all tribal remedies prior
to pursuing an action in state court.66
In employing contract analysis to find a general waiver, the
supreme court expressly refused to address the major underlying
question of whether the Tribal Government constituted a sovereign
body at all. 2 In his concurrence, Justice Moore considered the
issue and asserted that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) "constitutes an express indication of Congress' will that,
654. Hydaburg, 826 P.2d at 757.
655. Id. at 758 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
656. Id. at 759 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
657. 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992).
658. L at 1230. In 1940, the Village of Venetie had its constitution approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, thus creating the Tribal Government. It also
incorporated itself under the Indian Reorganization Act that year in order to
transact business for the community. Id. at 1230-31.
659. Id. at 1232.
660. Id. at 1233.
661. Id. The superior court had stayed the exercise of its jurisdiction and
ordered Nenana to exhaust its tribal court remedies. Id. at 1230.
662. Id at 1233.
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with the sole exception of the Metlakatla Indian Community, any
sovereign status held by Alaska Native groups prior to 1971 be
terminated."'  Chief Justice Rabinowitz dissented on the grounds
that the Tribal Government does constitute a sovereign body, and
as such, must be treated with great deference. In his view, the
federal government's grant of an Indian Reorganization Act
reservation gave the Tribal Government sovereignty."' Moreover,
Congress created ANCSA to protect aboriginal rights rather than
destroy them.60 Thus ANCSA's termination of reservations was
not intended to extinguish self-government.' In Chief Justice
Rabinowitz's view, proper deference to Native American sovereign-
ty would require an "explicit and unequivocal waiver of immunity"
by the Tribal Government and the exhaustion of tribal remedies
before the commencement of proceedings in the state courts.67
The third case reviewed by the supreme court on the issue of
native sovereignty was In the Matter of EP, W.M. and A.M.A In
this petition for temporary child custody brought by the Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services, the native Village of
Circle intervened and claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
involving three native children. 9 Circle relied on a recent Ninth
Circuit case, Native Village of Venetie LR.A. Council v. Alaska,67
which held that two native villages retained concurrent jurisdiction
in child custody matters. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals based
its decision on the fact that the villages are sovereign bodies with
663. Id. at 1243 (Moore, J., concurring). Justice Moore specifically pointed to
ANCSA's "declaration of policy," and found that any assertion that the Alaska
Natives had sovereignty "would be at odds with Congress' desire to abolish the
reservation system and to avoid prolonged wardship or trusteeship of Alaska
Natives." Id. at 1239 (citing American Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1601(b) (1988)) (Moore, J., concurring).
664. Id. at 1246 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
665. Id. at 1246-47 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
666. Id. at 1248 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
667. Id. at 1249-50 (citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987);
National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985);
Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 175 (Alaska 1977)) (Rabinowitz, C.J.,
dissenting).
668. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992).
669. I& at 1215.
670. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the same powers as continental Native American groups, including
jurisdiction in custody cases.67' The supreme court refused to
accept as binding precedent federal question decisions of federal
courts below the United States Supreme Court,672 and reaffirmed
its interpretation of title 25, section 1918(a) of the United States
Code, giving Alaska "'exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving
the custody of Indian children....""673  Chief Justice Rabinowitz,
again the lone dissenter, asserted that Circle's motion should be
granted because the Ninth Circuit case had employed the correct
analysis.674
X. PROCEDURE
The Alaska Supreme Court faced a variety of procedural issues
in 1992. Although many of the cases summarized in this section
address important substantive issues, procedural questions predomi-
nate. The case summaries are divided into four primary categories:
attorney's fees, failure of prosecution, statute of limitations, and
modification of final judgment. Other case summaries appear under
the "miscellaneous" heading at the end of this section.
A. Attorney's Fees
In In re Soldotna Air Crash Litigation,675 the supreme court
clarified the proper method for apportioning attorney's fees and
costs in a wrongful death case. 'Two of the defendants settled, but
SouthCentral Airlines obtained a jury verdict in its favor.676
Under Civil Rules 79 and 82, SouthCentral moved for recovery of
attorney's fees and costs.
After several attempts by SouthCentral to secure its fees, the
trial court allocated the costs against the decedents' estates,
671. F.P., W.M., and A.M., 843 P.2d at 1215 (citing Native Village of Venetie
I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1991)).
672. Id. at 1215 n.1 (citing Harrison v. State, 791 P.2d 359, 363 n.7 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990)).
673. Id. at 1215-16 (quoting Native Village of Nenana v. Department of Health
& Social Services, 722 P.2d 219, 221 (Alaska), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986)).
674. Id. at 5-14 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
675. 835 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1992).
676. Id. at 1217-18.
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assessing each liable for a one-seventh pro-rata share.6" South-
Central challenged the judgment on two substantive grounds: (1)
primary liability should have been assessed against the personal
representatives and the statutory beneficiaries; and (2) each party
should have been held jointly and severally liable rather than liable
for a mere one-seventh share.678
The supreme court held that the previous settlement constituted
a fund as provided for under Alaska Statutes section 09.60.040,
which the lower court should have reserved for distribution until it
could determine the "costs and expenses of suit" under Alaska's
wrongful death statute.679 Thus, the judgment should have been
"against the personal representatives in their official capacities...
[and] been 'chargeable' only against the reserved fund."'  Since
the trial court had since distributed the fund, the supreme court held
that SouthCentral could pursue the actual beneficiaries of the
judgment for costs and fees. 1
As for the choice between joint and several or pro-rata share
liability, the supreme court further held that the trial court had
discretion to determine the extent of each plaintiff's liability for
costs and fees.' The court ordered the trial court, however, to
reconsider the fairness of imposing pro-rata liability and to reallo-
cate liability for costs and fees so as to place responsibility for
payment upon the statutory beneficiaries.'
State Farm Insurance Co. v. American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co.,' also involved litigation over attorney's fees.
Wright was injured when her automobile collided with a car being
driven by Irueger. State Farm, the latter driver's insurance
company, negotiated a settlement of Wright's claims for $45,000, in
consideration for a waiver from Wright releasing State Farm from
677. Id. at 1219.
678. Id. at 1220.
679. Id at 1221 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a) (Supp. 1992)).
680. Id. at 1222.
681. Id. at 1223.
682. Id. (distinguishing Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979),
which stood for the proposition that in cases where multiple plaintiffs jointly moved
for consolidation, the trial court could - but was not required to - impose joint
and several liability for costs and fees).
683. Id at 1223-24.
684. 843 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1992).
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all claims and liens.' Both Wright and State Farm were aware
that American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company (AM-
MIC) had asserted a subrogation claim for $10,000 directly against
State Farm for Wright's previous medical treatment.'
State Farm subsequently paid $35,000 to Wright while placing
the remaining $10,000 in the court registry for an interpleader
action.' The superior court granted State Farm's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed it from the interpleader action,
awarding the insurer $1,000 as partial compensation for its fees
totaling $7,173.50.' State Farm appealed to the Alaska Supreme
Court that it was entitled to full recovery of fees.689
The supreme court noted that under Civil Rule 82(a)(1), where
no money is recovered in an interpleader action, the "prevailing
party" is entitled to fees "'fixed by the court in its discretion and in
a reasonable amount. ' ' 6 ° However, the court has permitted full
attorney's fees to be awarded in cases where a party's liability stems
from an indemnity clause 69' or where a party litigates in bad
faith.69  The supreme court first held that because State Farm
brought an action in interpleader, rather than an indemnity action,
the insurer did not satisfy the indemnity exception of Civil Rule
82(a)(1).69 The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to
allow State Farm to fully recover under an indemnity theory without
having ever established the right to indemnity.694 The court then
held that Wright did not litigate in bad faith. Because the settle-
ment agreement had not been clearly drafted, it was not improper
for Wright to dispute her liability for AMMIC's claim. 695 There-
685. Id. at 1211. The release stated in part: "The undersigned warrants that
he/she has the authority to execute this Release, that he/she has not assigned the
claim in full or in part and that there are no medical liens outstanding. He/She will
indemnify Releasees from any loss resulting from a breach of this warranty." Id.
686. Id.
687. 1&
688. Id.
689. Id. at 1212.
690. Id. (quoting ALASKA R. Cv. P. 82(a)(1)).
691. Id. (citing Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska 1976)).
692. Id. (citing Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 657 (Alaska 1989)).
693. Id. at 1213.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 1214.
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fore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
State Farm only partial fees.
In Hilliker v. Hilliker,696 the supreme court held that Adminis-
trative Rule 7(c), which limits recovery by the prevailing party to
expert fees of fifty dollars per hour, does not govern divorce
proceedings, and thus full reasonable costs may be awarded.6'
The court reasoned that the same underlying rationales which
preclude application of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 to divorce
proceedings justified a similar exception under Administrative Rule
7(c).698 First, courts should consider neither party in a divorce as
prevailing over the other.69  Second, courts should give both
parties the opportunity to present their case regardless of individual
economic circumstances.7' Third, Alaska Statutes section
26.24.140(a)(1), which authorizes the court to award a spouse
expenses during the pendency of an action, provides for "actual"
costs as well as attorney's fees. 01
B. Failure of Prosecution
In Smith v. Stratton,7' the supreme court considered wheth-
er Alaska Statutes section 09.10.24070 applies to an action dis-
missed prior to trial for failure to prosecute. Complying with a two-
year statute of limitations, Smith filed an action in October of 1986
against Stratton to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile
696. 828 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1992).
697. Id. at 1206. Administrative Rule 7(c) provides that "recovery of costs for
a witness called to testify as an expert is limited to the time when the expert is
employed and testifying and shall not exceed $50.00 per hour." Id.
698. Id
699. Id.
700. Id.
701. Id. The statute provides: "'During the pendency of the action, a spouse
may, upon application and in appropriate circumstances, be awarded expenses,
including (1) attorney fees and costs that reasonably approximate the actual fees
and costs required to prosecute or defend the action;. ' Id. at 1205 n.1
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140(a)(1) (1991)).
702. 835 P.2d 1162 (Alaska 1992).
703. Alaska Statutes section 09.10.240 provides: "If an action is commenced
within the time prescribed and is dismissed upon the trial or upon appeal after the
time limited for bringing a new action, the plaintiff... may commence a new
action upon the cause of action within one year after the dismissal or reversal on
appeal." ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.240 (Supp. 1992).
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collision. Smith granted a request from Stratton's insurer, Allstate
Insurance Company, for an indefinite extension of time to file an
answer so as to facilitate settlement negotiations between Smith and
Allstate regarding this accident and two subsequent unrelated
accidents occurring in 1987 and 1988.7o
On January 15, 1988, the clerk of the superior court issued a
Notice to Show Cause pursuant to Civil Rule 41, which asked why
the court should not dismiss Smith's cause of action. Although
Smith's attorney responded, the superior court dismissed the action
on June 24, 1988, when no further action had been undertaken by
the plaintif.705 On April 4, 1989, Smith reified the action, includ-
ing claims from the two later accidents in her pleading. Stratton
later moved for summary judgment, claiming that the cause of
action was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. °
Smith countered that Alaska Statutes section 09.10.240 permitted
the refiling of the case within one year of dismissal. 7
The supreme court construed the statutory phrase "dismissed
upon the trial or upon appeal" to encompass those cases dismissed
for failure to prosecute.7° The court reasoned that the legislature
could not have intended to exclude from the statute's reach those
causes of action dismissed before trial when they could be dismissed
after the commencement of trial for identical reasons.70 9 The
court therefore held Alaska Statutes section 09.10.240 "applies to all
actions which have been dismissed, other than on their merits, at
both the trial court and appellate court levels., 711
In Johnson v. Siegfried,711 the supreme court reviewed a lower
court's dismissal of a complaint under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(e). On May 10, 1989, Johnson filed a complaint
704. Smith, 835 P.2d at 1163.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. Id. at 1163-64.
708. Id. at 1165 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.240 (Supp. 1992)).
709. Id.
710. Id.
711. 838 P.2d 1252 (Alaska 1992).
712. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 41(e) provides that "[a]ctions which have
been pending in a court for more than one year without any proceedings having
been taken may be dismissed as a matter of course, for want of prosecution, by the
court on its own motion or on motion of a party to the action." ALASKA R. Civ.
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pro se against Dr. Siegfried alleging medical malpractice.713
Because process had not been served on Dr. Siegfried, on May 30,
1990, the court issued a Notice and Order of Dismissal pursuant to
Civil Rule 41(e)."' On July 3, 1990, Johnson secured an extension
order which cautioned that if no "proceedings" were undertaken
during the additional 180 days, the case would be dismissed. 715
During the allotted extension, Johnson obtained counsel, secured
the relevant medical records, prepared a summons, filed an
amended complaint and arranged for out-of-state counsel to appear
if the claim had merit.716 On the defendant's motion, the trial
court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute the
claim in a timely fashion under Rule 41(e).717
Interpreting the term "proceedings" as used in the extension
order to be no more demanding than as used in Rule 41(e), the
supreme court found that the plaintiff undertook adequate steps in
pursuit of the claim during the 180 day period to evidence a serious
determination to pursue the action.1 8 The court rejected the
argument that a "sufficient" complaint must be filed or served,
noting that the "proceedings" requirement necessitates only steps
that are "'reasonably expected in the pursuit of the cause of
action.""'7 9 Justice Burke dissented, arguing that the lower court
reasonably dismissed the case as it has "remained over the
defendant's head for more than three years" without any signs of
progressing to trial.
C. Statute of Limitations
In Siemion v. Rumfelt,"' the supreme court decided whether
to allow an amendment of the pleadings to relate back to the date
P. 41(e).
713. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 1253.
714. Id.
715. Id. at 1254.
716. Id Dr. Siegfried alleged that the amended complaint was defective for
failing to restate every pleading incorporated from the original complaint, as
required under Civil Rule 15(e). Id at 1256 n.5.
717. Id. at 1254.
718. Id. at 1255.
719. Id. at 1256 (quoting Shiffman v. "K", Inc., 657 P.2d 403, 403 (Alaska 1983)).
720. Id. at 1257 (Burke, J., dissenting).
721. 825 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1992).
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of the original complaint when the statute of limitations period had
since expired.tm Jeffrey Rumfelt, a minor driving his father's car,
collided with the Siemions' vehicle. The Siemions filed an action
seeking personal damages arising out of the accident against
Timothy Rumfelt, the minor's father.m Timothy Rumfelt then
filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgement because the
plaintiffs failed to name Jeffrey Rumfelt in the complaint. The
Siemions subsequently moved to amend their complaint to include
Jeffrey and his mother Vicky Rumfelt, requesting that the amend-
ment relate back to the date of the original complaint' which had
complied with the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by
Alaska Statutes section 09.10.07.' z
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, the
supreme court looked to the test set forth in Fanner v. State,7'
and held that although the Siemions showed that Jeffrey and Vicky
Rumfelt had sufficient notice of the action so as not to be preju-
diced,'2 the Siemions failed to provide any evidence showing that
there had been a mistake of identities.l
722. The court applied Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
723. Siemion, 825 P.2d at 897.
724. To be allowable, an amendment made after the passage of the statute of
limitations must relate back to the date of the original pleading. Id. at 898-99
(citing McCutcheon v. State, 746 P.2d 461, 469 (Alaska 1987)).
725. Id. at 827.
726. 788 P.2d 43, 49 (Alaska 1990). Farmer adopted the rule as stated in
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986):
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be
satisfied: (1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth
in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received
such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3)
that party must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning
identity, the action would have brought against it; and (4) the second and
third requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed
limitations period.
Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29.
727. Siemion, 825 P.2d at 900.
728. Id. at 901.
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D. Modification of Final Judgment
In Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp..' Palmer's husband was
killed in a plane crash.7' Palmer had originally filed a wrongful
death action against the pilot's estate but then learned that the
cause of the crash was most likely a defective carburetor float."'
As a result, she filed suit against the carburetor manufacturer in
1988, two years and nine days after the crash.732 The superior
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the two-year statute of limitations period had run." In
1990, the court determined in another plaintiff's case that the
carburetor manufacturer had prior knowledge that some of the
floats were defective.7' Consequently, the plaintiff refiled her suit
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2).735 The lower
court denied Palmer's motion without comment.7 6
The supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to consider the evidence of fraudulent concealment and
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.737 The supreme court noted
that the evidence was relevant and of such character that it "would
probably change the result in a new proceeding."' The supreme
court remanded the case, ordering the lower court to enter findings
concerning the existence of fraudulent concealment.739 If found,
the lower court must then determine whether the Palmer estate
discovered, or should have discovered, the fraudulent concealment
before the entry of summary judgment in the original suit.7'
729. 838 P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1992).
730. Id. at 1244.
731. Id. at 1245.
732. I&
733. 1&L
734. Id. at 1246.
735. Id. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) states that a court can relieve
a party from final judgment when there exists "newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b)." ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
736. Palmer, 838 P.2d at 1246.
737. Id at 1252.
738. Id.
739. MdL
740. Id. (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)).
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Lyman v. State74' involved a state employee who was fired
and subsequently filed concurrent wrongful termination suits in
federal and state court citing violations of federal grand jurors'
employment protection, federal civil rights, and a state law cause of
action.742 The superior court dismissed the state cause of action,
while the federal court found for the State of Alaska on the federal
claims and dismissed the state claim without prejudice.743 The
superior court subsequently granted Alaska's motion for summary
judgment on the federal claims on the basis of res judicata,
dismissing the case with prejudice.7 The court also awarded the
state attorney's fees, noting that the plaintiff's lawsuit "bordered on
the frivolous."'745
Lyman challenged the dismissal on the grounds that the court
should not have dismissed the claim with prejudice because his claim
was being reconsidered in the federal district court, and an appeal
to the circuit court was still possible.7 The court responded that
the nature of the dismissal was irrelevant because Lyman could
subsequently institute a state action under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5) if his federal appeal proves successful.747
Lyman also advanced a fairness argument that to make him pay
the state's costs would be unjust given that he was having financial
difficulty and was unemployed.7" The supreme court found that
the superior court's shifting of fees on the basis of Alaska Rules of
Civil Procedure 79 and 82 was in plain error.749 When the under-
lying claim is federal, the court must use the procedural standards
provided in the federal statutes rather than those of Alaska.75°
The federal statutes, in this case, authorized the recovery of
attorney's fees upon finding a claim to be frivolous, not bordering
741. 824 P.2d 703 (Alaska 1992).
742. 1&
743. Id.
744. Id. at 704-05.
745. Id. The fee award was made pursuant to Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure
79 and 82. Id. at 704.
746. Id. at 705.
747. Id.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 707.
750. Id.
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on such."5 Because there was no assessment as to which costs
were attributable to the state's defense of the state law claim, the
case was remanded for such a determination. 2
E. Miscellaneous
Cameron v. Hughes753 addressed two procedural questions
arising from an action to collect past due child support. After
divorcing Hughes, Cameron began receiving disability benefits due
to an injury which forced him to stop working. Hughes filed an
action to recover lost child support, and the superior court awarded
judgment in her favor for $26,746.31.' M Cameron, in turn, ap-
pealed the decision and fied for bankruptcy.755 Relying on Civil
Rule 204(d), Hughes subsequently moved for an order requiring
Cameron to place a supersedeas bond for $80,000 as security with
the court or face dismissal of his appeal.756 Hughes also moved to
increase her original judgment by $37,714.75 to reflect attorney's
and collection fees.757 The superior court granted both motions,
which Cameron immediately challenged.5'
Addressing the supersedeas bond, the supreme court held that
the superior court lacked authority to grant Hughes' motion.759
The bond provision of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 204(d) would
have effect only if Cameron as the appellant had requested a stay
pending appeal; this did not occur in the instant case.7"
In regard to the award of attorney's fees, the supreme court
remanded the case since no "findings concerning the necessity and
751. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (West Supp. 1991)). See supra text accompany-
ing note 745.
752. IM.
753. 825 P.2d 882 (Alaska 1992).
754. Id. at 883.
755. Id- at 884.
756. Id. The pertinent part of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 204(d) provides
that "[w]henever in a civil case an appellant entitled thereto desires a stay on
appeal, he may present to the superior court for its approval a supersedeas bond
which shall have such surety or sureties as the court requires." ALASKA R. CIr.
P. 204(d).
757. Cameron, 825 P.2d at 884.
758. Id.
759. Id. at 885.
760. Id,
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reasonableness" of the award were made.76 Although Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 82 allows the courts broad discretion in
awarding costs and fees when a party seeks modification of an
arrearage judgment, recovery is limited to the "'costs of the
action."'76
In State v. Kluti Kaah Native Village,' the supreme court
reviewed the issuance of a preliminary injunction obtained by the
residents of the Kluti Kaah Native Village of Copper Center that
replaced a seven day general moose hunt with a twenty-six day
subsistence hunt!'i In issuing the injunction, the superior court
found that the plaintiffs satisfied the three prongs of the "balance of
hardships" test:7 "'(1) the plaintiff must be faced with irrepara-
ble harm; (2) the opposing party must be adequately protected; and
(3) the plaintiffs must raise 'serious' and substantial questions going
to the merits of the case; that is, the issues raised cannot be
'frivolous or obviously without merit.""7
The supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that the second prong of the test had been met.7 67 The
court concluded that the trial court had failed to consider the
potential damage to the moose population and to the state's interest
in orderly game allocation when it granted the preliminary injunc-
tion.7  The court noted that since the lower court's issuance of
the injunction, seven other villages had filed similar claims for the
right to a greatly extended hunting season.7 69 Because the Kluti
Kaah failed to satisfy the "protection" prong of the test, the trial
court should have required a showing of probable success on the
merits.770
761. Id. at 887.
762. Id. (quoting O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225, 231 n.15 (Alaska 1981)).
763. 831 P.2d 1270 (Alaska 1992).
764. Id at 1271.
765. Id. at 1272 (citing AJ. Indus., Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 470 P.2d
537 (Alaska 1970), modified in other respects, 438 P.2d 198 (Alaska 1971)).
766. Id. at 1273 (quoting Messerli v. Department of Natural Resources, 768 P.2d
1112, 1122 (Alaska 1989)).
767. Id. at 1274.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id. at 1275.
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Chief Justice Rabinowitz was joined by Justice Compton in
dissent, arguing that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the injury to the public and the state would be
insignificant."" Contending that the extended hunt would neither
disadvantage non-subsistence hunters, nor injure the moose
population, the dissenters noted that the lower court's injunction
allowed the Kluti Kaah to harvest only forty moose, the same
number they were allotted under the original seven day general
hunt.rn
XI. PROPERTY LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court decided five consequential
cases in property law. The issues were diverse, ranging from the
rights of a contingent beneficiary to a trust to the application of the
ancient doctrine of lis pendens.
In Barber v. Barber,"3 William Lee Barber, the contingent
beneficiary of a private trust, contested the superior court's approval
of a settlement agreement which terminated the trust over his
objections.' 4 The supreme court held that the interest of a
contingent beneficiary is sufficiently definite to deserve constitution-
al due process protection.' 5 The court further held that as a
contingent beneficiary, Barber was considered an "interested party"
under the law governing the internal affairs of trusts and was
entitled, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 13.06.060, to notice of
the settlement proceedings." 6 Finding that Barber was provided
neither notice of the impending settlement proceeding nor an
opportunity to be heard prior to the court's approval of the
settlement agreement, the court concluded that the lowere court
erred in overruling Barber's objection to the settlement.777
In LeDoux v. Kodiak Island Borough, 8 Kodiak Island
Borough sought an injunction to prevent the LeDouxs from using
771. Id. at 1277 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
772. Id. (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
773. 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992).
774. Id. at 715.
775. Id. at 717.
776. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.060 (1985), cited in Barber, 837 P.2d at 717.
777. Barber, 837 P.2d at 717-18.
778. 827 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1992).
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their property as a professional office building in violation of the
Borough's parking regulations. The Borough had approved a
zoning variance for the property on the condition that adequate
parking spaces would be built, as set forth in a parking plan
submitted by the LeDouxs. The parking spaces, however, were
never provided, and the trial court granted the Borough's motion for
summary judgment.
The supreme court affirmed the issuance of an injunction, first
holding that the Borough was not required to show the lack of an
adequate remedy at law because Alaska Statutes section
29.40.190(a) specifically authorizes such injunctive relief 79
The supreme court also rejected the property owners' estoppel
argument, holding that the Borough's acceptance of a parking plan
was not a representation that the construction of the parking lot on
their property would be feasible.7 The supreme court reasoned
that to require the examination of the practicality of every variance
application would severely burden municipalities."'
In Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'
the supreme court held that a non-judicial foreclosure sale does not
as a matter of law operate to extinguish the underlying debt.7" In
this first-impression case, the senior lienholder Fireman's Fund
Mortgage Corporation had purchased the property at issue at its
own non-judicial foreclosure sale, discovering only after the sale that
the property had been destroyed by fire. The second mortgagee,
First National Bank of Anchorage, argued that when Fireman's
Fund foreclosed on the property, it was no longer entitled to collect
the insurance proceeds from the fire.7' Allstate, the insurer, filed
this interpleader action to determine the proper beneficiary of the
779. Id. at 1123 (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 29.40.190(a) (1992) ("An action to
enjoin a [zoning] violation may be brought notwithstanding the availability of any
other remedy.")).
780. Id. at 1124.
781. Id.
782. 838 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1992).
783. Id. at 793.
784. Id. at 792.
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insurance proceeds. The trial court granted First National's motion
for summary judgment, awarding the amount interpled plus interest.7"
The supreme court reversed, holding that under Alaska's
antideficiency statute,78 the non-judicial foreclosure did not
entirely divest Fireman's Fund of its right to collect the insurance
proceeds because the underlying debt had not been fully satis-
fied.71 The court did hold, however, that Fireman's Fund was
entitled to the insurance proceeds only to the extent necessary to
discharge the outstanding debt. The junior lienholder was entitled
to the remaining proceeds.71
In determining the amount of the outstanding debt, the
supreme court rejected Fireman's Fund's request to disregard its
offset bid made in ignorance of the property's damaged condition
at the foreclosure.8 9 The court reasoned that to disregard the bid
as an actual payment and award the insurance proceeds in entirety
would theoretically give the creditor a double recovery. °
The supreme court then held, however, that Fireman's Fund
was entitled to seek reformation of the foreclosure sales contract in
order to reflect the actual market value of the property in its
damaged state.79 The court has previously allowed reformation
where the interests of equity and justice so required, and the court
concluded that to permit reformation would be an appropriate
remedy in this case.71
In Leisnoi, Ina v. Stratman,793 the supreme court held that
pursuant to the doctrine of Us pendens, a native village corporation
was not bound by a settlement agreement made while the corpora-
tion was merged with another native village corporation.9
Leisnoi and Koniag, two native village corporations holding the
785. Id.
786. ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1990).
787. Fireman's Fund, 838 P.2d at 793-94.
788. Id. at 797.
789. Id. at 796.
790. Id at 795.
791. Id at 797. The court noted that Fireman's Fund would have the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that reformation of the offset bid is
warranted. Id.
792. Id. (citing Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1976)).
793. 835 P.2d 1202 (Alaska 1992).
794. Id. at 1208-09.
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surface rights and subsurface rights respectively to the property in
question, merged in 1980.795 The plaintiffs were cattle ranchers
whose grazing leases partially overlapped with the property.96 As
a result of a decertification action initiated by the plaintiffs,7"
Koniag entered into a settlement agreement, quitclaiming both
surface and subsurface title of the disputed property to the plaintiffs.
Demerger litigation was pending at the time of the settlement and
subsequently, Leisnoi was reconstituted as a separate corporation to
which the surface land rights were returned.7" The superior court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for specific performance, holding that
Leisnoi remained bound by the settlement agreement despite the
demerger.7 9
The supreme court reversed, relying upon the doctrine of lis
pendens.' which provides that "'[p]ersons acquiring an interest in
property that is a subject of litigation are bound by, or entitled to
the benefit of a subsequent judgment."'' The court held that
because the plaintiffs knew of the pending demerger litigation and
its possible ramifications, their interests under the settlement
agreement were subject to the outcome of that dispute.'
Justice Moore dissented, arguing that the "majority incorrectly
treat[ed] this case as one involving conflicting claims to title of real
property when the real issue is the enforceability of a contract for
the conveyance of real property."' 3 Justice Moore reasoned that
the doctrine of Us pendens is applicable only where a description of
the real property at issue is contained in the pleadings.'
795. Id. at 1205.
796. Id. at 1204.
797. The corporation had been certified under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-42 (1988). The plaintiffs had initiated an action
against the village corporations, seeking a permanent injunction to prevent the
transfer of land patents from the United States to the corporations. Leisnoi, 835
P.2d at 1204.
798. Leisnoi, 835 P.2d at 1205.
799. Id. at 1207.
800. id. at 1208 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMBNTS § 44 (1982)).
801. Id. (quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973)).
802. Id. at 1210.
803. Id. at 1212 (Moore, J., dissenting).
804. Id. at 1213 (citing Herman v. Goetz, 460 P.2d 554, 559 (Kan. 1969);
Flanagan v. Clark, 11 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1992)) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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In Foster v. Hanni,8°5 the supreme court considered whether,
in a leasehold dispute, a "cash offer is so different from a later offer
at the same price, but with owner financing, that the latter offer
would have to be resubmitted to the holder of the right of first
refusal."' 6 In remanding for further determinations, the court
held there were in fact two offers, both of which should have been
submitted to the lessor for first refusal.' Because banks were
unwilling to extend the necessary financing, the offer including long-
term seller financing was substantially more attractive than the
initial cash offer.'
XII. TAX LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided two significant cases in the
area of tax law during 1992. The first addressed the constitutionality
of retroactively applying a new tax rate; the other interpreted
provisions of the Multistate Tax Compact as adopted by Alaska.
In Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State,8 several large oil producers
challenged a statute increasing their tax liability. ° On March 22,
1989, the Alaska House of Representatives modified the tax formula
by a simple majority vote.81' A clause of the bill making the
statute immediately effective failed to gather the two-thirds majority
necessary for adoption. On May 8, the Senate passed the bill
by simple majority vote and the governor signed the bill that very
day.813 The statute contained a provision making it retroactively
effective from January 1, 1989.814
Article II, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution provides that
"[flaws passed by the legislature become effective ninety days after
enactment. The legislature may, by concurrence of two-thirds of the
805. 841 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1992).
806. 1& at 170.
807. 1& at 170-71.
808. Id. at 171.
809. 824 P.2d 708 (Alaska 1992).
810. Id.
811. 1& at 709.
812. 1&
813. 1&
814. Act of May, 1989, Ch. 25, § 4, 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 1.
[VOL. 10:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
membership of each house, provide for another effective date. '' S
The oil producers argued that, as the House vote on the immediate
effective date did not pass, the effective date was August 6, 1989,
ninety days after the governor had signed the bill."'
The supreme court first found article II, section 18 of the
Alaska constitution did not provide substantive protection against
retroactive legislation. 17 The court distinguished retroactivity
from an effective date: a retroactive provision identifies what
conduct will be effected, while an enactment date identifies when
the conduct will be effected."8 Relying on this analysis and noting
its consistency with other jurisdictions' interpretations of tax laws,
the court held article II, section 18 does not require a two-thirds
vote of the legislature to enact retroactive provisions.1
In State Department of Revenue v. Parsons Corp.,' the
Department of Revenue (DOR) challenged the income figures
Parsons reported under three contracts for construction of oil and
gas facilities for an oil conglomerate (ARCO)." Hired as an
independent contractor, Parsons was responsible for the fabrication,
delivery, and on-site construction of modules and other equip-
ment.' Title to such property was not to pass from Parsons to
ARCO until the equipment and modules were completed, delivered,
and accepted on site.' Partial fabrication of this equipment took
place in other states. 4
Under the Multistate Tax Compact, Alaska determines the tax
liability of inter-state businesses by measuring the income generated
in each state through three factors: property, payroll and sales.'
Parsons argued the ARCO contracts involved sale of agency services
815. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 18.
816. Ch. 25, § 4; Arco, 824 P.2d at 709.
817. Id. at 710.
818. Id. at 711.
819. Id. at 712.
820. 843 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 1992).
821. Id. at 1239-40.
822. Id. at 1240.
823. Id.
824. Id. Parsons provided engineering, design, and procurement services from
its office in California. Some assembly and construction management occurred in
Washington and Oregon. Id.
825. ALAsKA STAT. § 43.19.010 Art. IV(9) (1990).
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performed in California, while DOR argued the contracts covered
sale of property to an Alaska customer.' The supreme court
upheld DOR's characterization of both the nature and the site of
Parson's sales.' Alaska Statutes section 43.19.010 classifies the
sale of tangible personal property as within Alaska if the "property
is delivered or shipped to a purchaser" within the state.8 Al-
though the modules were ordered from Parsons' facilities outside of
Alaska, the court found the ultimate recipient and purchaser,
ARCO, to be in Alaska. In rejecting Parsons' argument the sales
were for services, the court noted the sales included the entire
reimbursed cost for the materials, in addition to the fee. 29
In considering the proportion of activities occurring within the
state, the court observed the importance of these contracts to
Parsons.' 3 Thus, the court held DOR could properly allocate all
of the revenues to Alaska for sales factor purposes, even though
most of Parsons' activities took place out of state. 31 The court
concluded "[f]ailure to attribute sales to the state in which they are
made 'would greatly underrepresent the extent"' of Parsons'
activities within Alaska. 2
XIII. TORT LAW
In 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court extended the range and
flexibility of the tort law provisions it reviewed. The cases decided
by the supreme court have been classified under causes of action,
affirmative defenses, procedure and damages. Addressing causes of
action, the court expanded liability in several areas: prescription
drug products, parental wrongful death suits for loss of society of a
dependent child, and legal malpractice. The court's expansive
approach also applied to affirmative defenses, where the court
826. Parsons, 843 P.2d at 1242.
827. Md at 1239.
828. Id at 1242; ALAsKA STAT. § 43.19.010 (1990).
829. Parsons, 843 P.2d at 1243.
830. Id. Parsons characterized itself as the "unrivaled leader in the modular-
ization of production and process facilities for use" on the North Slope. Id.
831. Id
832. d2 (quoting Sjong v. State Dep't of Revenue, 622 P.2d 967, 978 (Alaska
1981)).
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discussed the circumstances insulating a bailor from the tort of
conversion after surrendering property to a third party.
A. Causes of Action
In Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 3 the supreme court held that
prescription drugs are not exempt from strict products liability
claims alleging a design defect. Under Alaska's previous two-prong
test for design defect products liability, a product is defectively
designed if: "'(1) [it] failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, or (2) [given proof that the product proximate-
ly caused the injury,] the defendant fails to prove . .. that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design.'
''8
Reasoning that patients generally hold few expectations
concerning the performance safety of prescription drugs, the court
altered the consumer expectation prong of the test to consider
instead the expectations of the "ordinary doctor" as to how the drug
will operate.83' The court upheld the risk/benefit prong of the test,
refusing to assert as a rule that the social benefits of drugs and the
potential chilling of research and production of new drugs always
outweigh the benefits to the public of imposing strict liability for
design defects
s36
[Instead,] the fact finder should consider the seriousness of the
side effects or reactions posed by the drug, the likelihood that
such side effects or reactions would occur, the feasibility of an
alternative design which would eliminate or reduce the side
effects or reactions without affecting the efficacy of the drug,
and the harm to the consumer in terms of reduced efficacy and
any new side effects or reactions that would result from an
alternative design. In evaluating the benefits, the fact finder
should be permitted to consider the seriousness of the condition
for which the drug is indicated. 37
833. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992); see Thomas A. Matthews, Products Liability
in Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1993).
834. Id. at 1194 (quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878 n.15
(Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978)).
835. Id. at 1195.
836. Id. at 1196.
837. Id. at 1196-97 (declining to adopt comment K to section 402(a) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts).
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In examining the lower court's jury instructions on the failure-
to-warn claim, the court found two errors. First, the instructions
treated the strict liability claim as a negligence claim. 8 Second,
the instructions placed the burden of proving Upjohn's knowledge
of the risks of injury on the plaintiff, rather than placing on the
defendants the burden of establishing that the risks, if proven, were
scientifically unknowable at that time. 9 Addressing the plaintiff's
negligence per se claims under Alaska Statutes sections 17.20.290(1)
and 17.20.090(6), the supreme court held that the superior court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a negligence per se jury
instruction since the statutes added little to the common law duty to
warn.
80
In Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 1 the supreme court
declared that parents may recover for loss of society arising from
the wrongful death of a dependent child."2 The court recognized
that Alaska's wrongful death statute allows the spouse, child or
dependent of the decedent to recover for the emotional loss that he
or she experiences, but that wrongful death actions maintained by
the personal representative measure recovery only by the loss to the
decedent's estate.' The court advanced, however, a two-step
rationale to allow another statutory provision to grant the parents
of a deceased child a cause of action for loss of society.
First, the court held that Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010,81
adopted from the Oregon civil code in 1900, authorizes a separate
parental cause of action, reasoning that the interpretation of the
Oregon Supreme Court prior to 1900, which allowed such actions,
838. AL at 1199 (citing Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981)).
839. Id. at 1199-1200.
840. Alaska Statutes section 17.20.290(a)(1) of the Alaska Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act bars the manufacture or sale of misbranded drugs. Alaska Statutes
section 17.20.090(6) states that a drug is misbranded unless its labeling bears
adequate directions and warnings.
841. 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992).
842. Id. at 1274.
843. Id. at 1272-73 (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (Supp. 1991); quoting In
re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329, 331 (Alaska 1977)).
844. Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010 provides that "[a] parent may maintain an
action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a child below the age of majority....
ALASKA STAT. §09.15.010 (1983).
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had also been adopted by the Alaska legislature."45 Second, the
court noted that under Alaska law, in the spousal context, the
master-servant recovery principle had evolved to include comfort
and companionship.' Thus recognizing the parental cause of
action to be parallel to wrongful death actions under section
09.55.580, the court held that parents may recover for loss of society
of a child. 7
Chief Justice Rabinowitz concurred, stating that he would
prefer that the court not "resuscitate" section 09.15.010, but rather
find a common law action for loss of a child's society." Such an
action, the Chief Justice asserted, would not be precluded or
preempted by the operation of the state's wrongful death stat-
ute.r49
In Doe v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin,' the
court examined whether lawyers representing adoptive parents in an
artificial insemination procedure erred as a matter of law in failing
to fully comply with adoption procedures required under the Indian
Child Welfare Act. 5  To save their client expense,"'2 the attor-
neys advised the adoptive parents to first request the superior
court's opinion as to whether the statute applied. 3 The superior
court determined that it did not, and a final decree of adoption was
entered.' Approximately one year later, the child's natural
845. Gillispie, 842 P.2d at 1273 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.15.010 (1983)
(formerly 31 Stat. 337 (1900)); HILL'S ANNOTATED LAWS OF OREGON, § 34)
(quoting City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 208 (Alaska 1962) ("'[I]t is
presumed that [the statutes were] adopted with the interpretation that had been
placed upon [them] by the Oregon Supreme Court prior to 1900."'))
846. Id. (citing Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974)).
847. Id-
848. L (Rabinowitz, CJ., concurring).
849. I& (Rabinowitz, CJ., concurring).
850. 838 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1992).
851. Id. at 805-806 (citing Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1978)
(requiringjudicial certification that natural parents of an "Indian Child" understood
terms and consequences of their consent to the adoption)).
852. Id. at 807.
853. Id. at 805. The attorneys secured the natural mother's signed, written
consent to terminate her rights. The issue presented to the superior court,
therefore, was whether Hughes, Thorsness needed to take "the additional steps
needed to make the mother's consent 'valid."' Id.
854. Id.
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mother initiated a suit to vacate the adoption on the theory that her
consent was not obtained in accordance with the Act's requirements.
After the adoptive parents and their new counsel successfully
defended the adoption decree, the parents brought a legal malprac-
tice claim against Hughes, Thorsness.85
The supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendants, holding that malpractice
occurred as a matter of law through the lawyers' failure to advise
their clients that complying with the statute would be prudent. 6
The court concluded that "[a]ny uncertainty there might have been
about the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act made
Hughes, Thorsness' failure to obtain compliance with the Act more,
rather than less, blameworthy . ... The decision to ignore the
additional steps required for a 'valid' consent was anything but the
act of a reasonably prudent lawyer."'
In Beck v. State Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities,"8 the supreme court reversed summary judgment against
Beck's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The court
held that viewing the injuries of a loved one at the hospital, rather
than at the accident scene was sufficiently foreseeable and close
enough in time to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotion-
al distressY9
B. Affirmative Defenses
The plaintiff in Thompson v. Andersons" sued Mail Boxes,
Inc., and its employee Anderson, for the tort of conversion.
Thompson had asked Anderson to send a package box by Federal
Express, although he later agreed to have it shipped by DBL.86
Suspicious of Thompson, the employee obtained permission from
855. IcL at 806.
856. I& at 807.
857. Id. at 807 n.7.
858. 837 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1992). See infra notes 874-875, 902-906 and
accompanying text.
859. Id. at 111 (citing Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 365
(Alaska 1987); Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska
1986)).
860. 824 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1992).
861. Id- at 713.
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both DHL and Federal Express to open the package as their
agent. 2 Upon opening the box, she discovered a large sum of
cash, which the police later seized as alleged drug money."
The supreme court held that the defendants were not liable for
conversion, reasoning that "it should not be a tort for a bailee to
obey the command of a police officer to turn over property in the
bailee's possession." '' In a footnote, the court expressly limited
its holding, stating that it expressed no opinion as "to situations
where the bailee has the option of not delivering the property to the
police."' 5
In University of Alaska v. Shanti,86 the supreme court held
that a university-owned ski hill was "improved land" under Alaska's
recreational use/landowner immunity statute.s7 The university, in
an attempt to defend a suit arising from a sledding accident, had
claimed tort immunity as an owner of "unimproved land."' The
superior court disagreed, holding that the ski hill did not constitute
"unimproved land" because it was in or near an urban area. 9
Concurring in the lower court's judgment but not in its
rationale, the supreme court affirmed the denial of summary
judgment to the University. In its first opportunity to construe
Alaska Statutes section 09.45.795, the supreme court looked to the
statute's legislative history and to other jurisdictions to shape its
definition of "unimproved land."'  The court then held that for
purposes of determining immunity under the statute on a motion for
summary judgment, trial courts should weigh the following factors
in distinguishing between improved and unimproved land: "(1) the
proximity of improvements to the accident site; (2) the extent of the
property maintenance undertaken by the landowner; and (3)
862. Md
863. Id. at 713-14. At the criminal trial, the evidence was suppressed as the fruit
of an illegal search. Id. at 714.
864. Id. at 715.
865. Id. at 715 n.7.
866. 835 P.2d 1225 (Alaska 1992).
867. Id. at 1226-27 & n.1 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.795 (Supp. 1991)).
868. Shand, 835 P.2d at 1227.
869. Id at 1226.
870. Id. at 1228-32 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.795 (Supp. 1991); Walker v.
City of Scottsdale, 786 P.2d 1057 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Boaldin v. University of
Kansas, 747 P.2d 811, 813 (Kan. 1987)).
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whether the character of the property as a whole justifies the
conclusion that the landowner is responsible for reasonable risk
management of the area." "
The court found that the University kept the ski hill as a
maintained, landscaped section of the main campus and that the hill
was located near a gymnasium and a hockey rink.' Applying the
above factors, the court held as a matter of law that the hill was
"improved land" not covered by Alaska Statutes section 09.45.795
and affirmed the denial of summary judgment.' "
C. Procedure
In Beck v. State Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities,' the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether still
photos may be admitted as evidence to depict a moving scene.
Beck challenged an evidentiary ruling, claiming that the lower court
erred in admitting experimental evidence that had purported to
reconstruct the road conditions at the time of an auto accident. The
supreme court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the
standards for experimental evidence announced in Love v. State,'"
agreeing that the experimental conditions were substantially similar
to those existing at the time of the accident.
In Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin,8"
the supreme court faced a host of procedural issues arising out of
Bohna's malpractice claim against both Hughes, Thorsness and
Allstate, and a resulting indemnity cross-claim by Allstate against
Bohna and the law firm. Most notably, the court held clearly
erroneous the lower court's granting to both Allstate and Bohna the
same number of peremptory challenges as had been given to
Hughes, Thorsness. The supreme court found that under Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 47(d),8 " Allstate and Bohna did not have
871. Id. at 1232 (footnotes omitted).
872. Id.
873. Id
874. 837 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1992). See supra notes 858-859 and infra notes 902-
906 and accompanying text.
875. 457 P.2d 622, 627 (Alaska 1969).
876. 828 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1992). See infra notes 881-895 and accompanying text.
877. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 47(d) governs peremptory challenges and
provides in part:
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adverse interests and should have been treated as a single party for
the award of challenges."
Because Hughes, Thorsness did not produce any compelling
proof that the jury was not impartial. 9 Thus, the trial court's
mistake was harmless error: "[w]hether or not any or all of these
people [stricken by the four extra challenges] were biased in some
fashion, [Hughes, Thorsness] has no basis to complain as long as
four unbiased people were selected in their places."
D. Damages
The supreme court also addressed several damages issues in
Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin. s Bohna
sued Hughes, Thorsness under the theory that rather than settle his
case within the limits of his insurance policy, the attorneys made
offers of judgment in excess of the policy limits pursuant to Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 68.' This strategy apparently caused
Bohna to incur a large uninsured judgment.' Bohna agreed to
the strategy, however, because he thought that the size of the
settlement would not matter when he pursued bankruptcy.'
After settling for $4.6 million, prejudgment interest included, Bohna
discovered that he might not be able to discharge the judgment in
bankruptcy because the accident involved alcohol. The defendant
Each party may challenge peremptorily three jurors. Two or more parties
on the same side are considered a single party for purposes of peremptory
challenge, but where multiple parties having adverse interests are aligned
on the same side, three peremptory challenges shall be allowed to each
party represented by a different attorney.
ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 47(d). The trial court initially gave each party three
peremptory challenges, but upon subsequent agreement, the number was raised to
four. Bohna, 828 P.2d at 761 n.44.
878. Bohna, 828 P.2d at 761-62 (citing ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 47(d)).
879. Id at 763.
880. Id.
881. 828 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1992). See supra notes 876-880 and accompanying
text.
882. Civil Rule 68 provides in part that if a settlement offer proves to be greater
than the offeree's final judgment, the offeree will be ineligible to recover any costs
or fees incurred after the offer was made and will be liable for such fees incurred
by the offeror. Id. at 749 n.6 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68).
883. Id. at 748.
884. Id.
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agreed not to enforce the judgment while Bohna sued his attorneys
and insurer for malpractice. Allstate settled with Bohna for $1
million, and then sued Hughes, Thorsness for indemnity.'
The supreme court rejected the law firm's claim that Bohna
failed to mitigate damages by not pursuing bankruptcy proceedings.
The court noted that bankruptcy would not nullify Bohna's
malpractice claim, but merely transfer it to the trustee in bankruptcy
as an asset. "Moreover, even if Bohna's bankruptcy would have
reduced [Hughes Thorsness's] liability, we hold as a matter of public
policy that the duty to mitigate does not extend to filing for
bankruptcy."s
In conjunction with his settlement with Allstate, Bohna had
signed a $3 million loan receipt agreement, to be repaid to the
extent of the proceeds from his suit against Hughes, Thorsness.m
The trial court held that any portion of the $3 million loan that
Bohna was not required to repay to Allstate was "consideration" for
Bohna's release of Allstate and thus deductible from the verdict by
statute. 9 Although Hughes, Thorsness claimed that loan receipt
agreements violate Alaska law and public policy in the plaintiff/co-
defendant setting,"g the supreme court held that such an agree-
ment did not constitute an "illegal assignment." '' Hughes
Thorsness further argued that the loan receipt agreement permits a
settling tortfeasor to effect contribution from a nonsettling joint
tortfeasor contrary to the intent of the Alaska Statutes section
09.16.010(d)."9 The supreme court found no statutory language
885. Id. at 750-51.
886. Id. at 748.
887. Id. at 754.
888. Id. at 748.
889. Id. at 751-52, 758 ("'When a release ... is given in good faith to two or
more persons liable in tort for the same injury... it reduces the claim against the
others... in the amount of the consideration paid for it....') (quoting ALASKA
STAT. § 09.16.040(1) (repealed March 5, 1989)).
890. Id. at 755-56.
891. Id. at 756.
892. Id. at 757. The statute once provided:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled
to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the
injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in
respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was
reasonable.
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prohibiting such agreements."9  However, in determining the
proper amount the lower court should have deducted from the
verdict as consideration, the court noted that "if the [full] loan
amount... is not treated as consideration.., neither plaintiffs nor
settling defendants would have any incentive not to structure 100%
of all settlements as [loan receipt agreements]."8" Acknowledging
its minority stance in deducting the full amount, the court reasoned
that such a position does not run afoul of the uniformity of
interpretation clause of Alaska's Uniform Contribution Act.895
In Williams v. Utility Equipment, Inc.,196 the supreme court
reviewed the disbursement of settlement funds in a products liability
claim in which Williams attributed his back injury to a fall from a
defectively designed truck. The jury found that Williams did not fall
off the truck and returned a verdict in the defendant's favor. At the
close of trial, the plaintiff's attorneys held a large sum of money
from pretrial settlements with two other manufacturer co-defen-
dants. The supreme court was asked to assess whose right to the
funds took precedence: Utility Equipment's right to attorney's fees
as the prevailing party; Williams' attorneys' own statutory right to
the settlement funds as compensation; or the employer's right (held
by the insurer Alaska Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(ARECA)) to recoup workers' compensation benefits."9
The supreme court first noted that Williams' litigation costs had
exceeded the total recovery from which ARECA demanded its
compensation. "Essentially, ARECA asks to share in the fruits of
Williams' successful claims while forcing Williams to shoulder the
entire cost of his unsuccessful claim against Utility Equipment.
'
"
8 98
The court held that while the plaintiff may voluntarily agree to
earlier disbursements, "he or she has the right to retain any funds
recovered until all third-party claims are resolved." 89
Id. at 757 n.28 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(d) (repealed March 5, 1989)).
893. Id. at 757.
894. 1& at 758.
895. Id. at 759 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.050 (repealed March 5, 1989)).
896. 837 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1992).
897. 1& at 1117 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.015(g) (1990), 34.35.430(b)
(1990); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82).
898. Id.
899. Id at 1117-18.
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To adjudicate the remaining competing claims of Williams' own
lawyers and the victorious opposing counsel for Utility Equipment,
the court applied Alaska Statutes section 34.35.430(b), which
provides that an attorney lien is "subordinate to the rights existing
between the parties."'  Construing the statute to refer only to the
"parties" actually involved in the settlement, and not to Utility
Equipment, a third party to the pretrial settlement, the court held
the rights of Wlliams' attorneys' superior. °1
The supreme court examined the lower court's rulings on
wrongful death damages in Beck v. State Department of Trans-
portation and Public Facilities.' Relying on prior Alaska case
law, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling that to limit recovery
by the amount that an unwed, childless decedent would have spent
on dependents is "too speculative."' Rather, in wrongful death
cases where the decedent is survived by neither spouse nor
dependents, recovery is limited to "the decedent's probable future
earnings, less the amount he would have spent on living expenses
assuming 'an absence of dependents throughout the deceased's life
expectancy."' '' -
Beck also argued that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.040(a)-(b),
which requires the reduction of future economic awards to the
present value, applies only to personal injury awards, and therefore
excludes by omission wrongful death recoveries. ° The supreme
court held that although the legislature had not foreseen this
particular argument, the legislative intent underlying the statute
encompassed wrongful death awards.'
Attila . Bodi
Debra E. Munsen
James P Walsh
900. Id. at 1118 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.430(b) (1990)).
901. Id.
902. 837 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1992). See supra notes 858-859, 874-875 and
accompanying text.
903. Id. at 116 (citing Osborne v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 560 (Alaska 1983); In
re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d at 329, 332 (Alaska 1977)).
904. IaM at 116 (quoting Osborne, 669 P.2d at 560).
905. Id. at 116-17 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.040(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992)).
906. Id. at 117.
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